82 - 1822

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1983

VICTOR D. QUILICI, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT GILBERT JOHNSTON*
315 S. Plymouth Court
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 427-2737
Attorney for Petitioner
Victor D. Quilici

Of Counsel
VICTOR D. QUILICI
1043 S. York Road
Bensenville, Illinois 60106
(312) 595-2245

*Counsel of Record

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6581

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a local ordinance that makes it a crime for a private, law-abiding citizen to keep a handgun in his home, i.e., his castle, for self-defense violates a fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment and Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

PARTIES AFFECTED

(See Appendix A, at App. 5)

Appellant-Plaintiffs Below:

Victor D. Quilici, George L. Reichert, Robert E. Metler, Robert Stengl, Martin Gutenkauf, Alice Gutenkauf, Walter J. Dutchak, Geoffrey Lagioia.

Appellee-Defendants Below:

The Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Richard T. Flickinger, Norman W. Glavner, Jerry Schuhrke, Neil J. Cashman, Joan B. De[illegible] Don Sneider, Richard P. Hohs, Lewis D. Greenberg, Greggory A. Youstra.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Other Authorities

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To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your Petitioner, Victor D. Quilici, respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the above case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, that is reported at 695 F.2d 261, is attached as Appendix A. The decision of United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, that is reported at 532 F. Supp. 1169, is attached as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The judgment for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was entered on 6 December 1982, a copy of which is attached as Appendix C. An Order was entered 10 December 1982 correcting a typographical error, a copy of which is attached as Appendix D. An Order was entered on 2 March 1982 denying the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Suggestion for Hearing *En Banc*, a copy of which is attached as Appendix E. This Court has jurisdiction under Title 28, Section 1254, United States Code.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Amendment (II)

A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

Amendment (IX)

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

ORDINANCE INVOLVED

Village of Morton Grove Ordinance 81-11 is set out in full in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at Footnote 1, (Appendix A at App. 1).

Section 2(B)(3) provides in part that "No person shall possess in the Village of Morton Grove . . . (a)ny handgun unless the same has been rendered permanently inoperative." Section 2(E) allows peace officers and others in limited circumstances to possess handguns.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Victor D. Quilici, and his family live in the Village of Morton Grove. He is a lawyer licensed in Illinois and a private, law-abiding citizen. He owns two handguns.

The Village on 8 June 1981, adopted an ordinance that makes it a crime for a private law-abiding citizen to keep a handgun in his home.

Petitioner filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, State of Illinois. The Respondent removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Appendix A, at App. 5). The District Court on 29 December 1981, entered a summary judgment in favor of the Respondent and all other Defendants and against Petitioner and all other Plaintiffs. It ruled that the ordinance was constitutional. It ruled that the Petitioner did not have a constitutional right to keep a handgun in his home for self-defense. The Order of the District Court is attached as Appendix G.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on 6 December 1982 affirmed in a split decision. It ruled that the Petitioner did not have a constitutional right under the Second Amendment and the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution to keep a handgun in his home, i.e., his "castle", for self-defense (Appendix A. at App. 15-20). On 2 March 1982 it denied in split decision Petitioner's Petition for a rehearing and Suggestion for a Hearing *En Banc*.

Your Petitioner now asks for a Writ of Certiorari.

EXISTENCE OF JURISDICTION BELOW

Respondent removed this case from state court to the District Court under Title 28, Section 1441, United States Code, because Petitioner alleged ordinance 81-11 was unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Illinois State Constitution. Respondent alleged jurisdiction under Title 28, Section 1331, United States Code.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECIDED A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION THAT IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO EVERY CITIZEN.

The Seventh Circuit decided that a local ordinance which made it a crime for a private law abiding citizen to keep a handgun in his home, i.e., his castle, for self-defense was constitutional. It decided that the ordinance did not impinge on constitutional rights protected by the Second Amendment and the Ninth Amendment. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit decided a substantial federal constitutional question that is of vital importance to every citizen.

The Seventh Circuit clearly stated that "gun control [is] of vital importance to every citizen." (Appendix A, at App. 7.) Its statement is strongly supported by the widespread response to Ordinance 81-11 and this case. (See Appendix F for a partial list of media coverage of the ordinance and the case.) The Seventh Circuit decided the Second Amendment question on *Presser* v. *Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), a hundred year old decision that is without vitality or logic, and *United States* v. *Miller*, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), a decision that is not controlling. The majority opinion suggests that whether *Presser* is illogical and *Miller* is wrongly applied are questions for this Court rather than the Seventh Circuit. (Appendix A, at App. 17-19.) The Seventh Circuit decided the Ninth Amendment question on the basis of the lack of any authority

directly in point. It implicitly suggests that the question of whether a specific constitutional right to keep a handgun in one's home for self-defense exists may only be decided by this Court. The Seventh Circuit seemingly thought it was powerless to address the question. In short, it refers Petitioner to this Court for relief as to both questions.

In his dissent Judge Coffey found the decision particularly disturbing "as it sanctions governmental action . . . [that] impermissably interferes with basic human freedoms." He believed that the "majority cavilierly dismisses the argument that the right to possess commonly owned arms for self-defense and the protection of loved ones is a *fundamental right* protected by the Constitution," (Appendix A, at App. 37); that the majority . . . "refused to take cognizance of the natural right of an individual . . . to protect his home and family from unlawful and dangerous intrusions," (Appendix A, at App. 38); that the ordinance "violates both the *fundamental right* to privacy and the *fundamental right* to defend the home . . .," (Appendix A, at App. 39); (emphasis added).

Gun control is of "vital importance to every citizen" and the case involves fundamental rights arising under the federal constitution. The question presented therefore is of "substance"; it is not merely "eposodic" or "academic." See *Rice* v. *Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetary*, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). It involves the kind of questions that this Court should and only this Court can definitively resolve.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT GILBERT JOHNSTON
315 S. Plymouth Ct.
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 427-2737
Attorney for Petitioner
Victor D. Quilici

Of Counsel
VICTOR D. QUILICI
1043 S. York Road
Bensenville, Illinois 60106
(312) 595-2245

DATED: Chicago, Illinois
5 May 1983.

APPENDIX A

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 82-1045, 82-1076 & 82-1132

VICTOR D. QUILICI, ROBERT STENGL, et al.,
GEORGE L. REICHERT, and ROBERT E. METLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, *et al.*,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 81 C 3432, 81 C 4086 & 81 C 5071
Bernard M. Decker, *Judge.*

ARGUED MAY 28, 1982—DECIDED DECEMBER 6, 1982

Before BAUER, WOOD, and COFFEY, *Circuit Judges.*

BAUER, *Circuit Judge.* This appeal concerns the constitutionality of the Village of Morton Grove's Ordinance No. 81-11,[1] which prohibits the possession of handguns

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[1] Ordinance No. 81-11, in pertinent part, provides:

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND OTHER DANGEROUS WEAPONS

Whereas, it has been determined that in order to promote and protect the health and safety and welfare of the public it is necessary

(footnote continued)

(footnote continued)

to regulate the possession of firearms and other dangerous weapons, and

Whereas, the Corporate Authorities of the Village of Morton Grove have found and determined that the easy and convenient availability of certain types of firearms and weapons have increased the potentiality of firearm related deaths and injuries, and

Whereas, handguns play a major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery, and accidental injury and death.

Now, Therefore, Be It Ordained By The President And Board Of Trustees Of The Village Of Morton Grove, Cook County, Illinois, As Follows:

Section 1: The Corporate Authorities do hereby incorporate the foregoing Whereas clauses into the Ordinance, thereby making the findings as hereinabove set forth.

Section 2: That Chapter 132 of the Code of Ordinances of the Village of Morton Grove be and is hereby amended by the addition of the following section:

"*Section* 132.102. Weapons Control

(A) Definitions:

Firearm: "Firearms" means any device, by whatever name known, which is designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion of gas or escape of gas; excluding however:

(1) Any pneumatic gun, spring gun or B-B gun which expels a single globular projectile not exceeding .18 inches in diameter.

(2) Any device used exclusively for signalling or safety and required or recommended by the United States Coast Guard or the Interstate Commerce Commission.

(3) Any device used exclusively for the firing of stud cartridges, explosive rivets or similar industrial ammunition.

(4) An antique firearm (other than a machine gun) which, although designed as a weapon, the Department of Law Enforcement of the State of Illinois finds by reason of the date of its manufacture, value, design and other characteristics is primarily a collector's item and is not likely to be used as a weapon.

(footnote continued)

(footnote continued)

(5) Model rockets designed to propel a model vehicle in a vertical direction.

Handgun: Any firearm which (a) is designed or redesigned or made or remade and intended to be fired while held in one hand or (b) having a barrel of less than 10 inches in length or (c) a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person.

Person: Any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, club, society or joint stock company.

Handgun Dealer: Any person engaged in the business of (a) selling or renting handguns at wholesale or retail (b) manufacture of handguns (c) repairing handguns or making or firing special barrels or trigger mechanisms to handguns.

Licensed Firearm Collector: Any person licensed as a collector by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States under and by virtue of Title 18, United States Code, Section 923.

Licensed Gun Club: A club or organization, organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets, licensed by the Village of Morton Grove under Section 90.20 of the Code of Ordinances of the Village of Morton Grove.

(B) Possession:

No person shall possess, in the Village of Morton Grove the following:

(1) Any bludgeon, black-jack, slug shot, sand club, sand bag, metal knuckles or any knife, commonly referred to as a switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring, or other device in the handle of the knife, or

(2) Any weapon from which 8 or more shots or bullets may be discharged by a single function of the firing device, any shotgun having one or more barrels less than 18 inches in length, sometimes called a sawed off shotgun or any weapon made from a shotgun, whether by alteration, modification or otherwise, if such weapon, as modified or altered has an overall length of less than 26 inches, or a barrel length of less than 18 inches or any bomb, bomb-shell, grenade, bottle or other container containing an explosive substance of over one-quarter ounce for like purposes, such as, but not limited to black powder

(footnote continued)

(footnote continued)

bombs and molotov cocktails or artillery projectiles; or

(3) Any handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently inoperative.

(C) Subsection B(1) shall not apply to or affect any peace officer.

(D) Subsection B(2) shall not apply to or affect the following:

(1) Peace officers;

(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries, jails and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense;

(3) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the Illinois National Guard, while in the performance of their official duties; and

(4) Transportation of machine guns to those persons authorized under Subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection to possess machine guns, if the machine guns are broken down in a non-functioning state or not immediately accessible.

(E) Subsection B(3) does not apply to or affect the following:

(1) Peace officers or any person summoned by any peace officer to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace while he is actually engaged in assisting such officer and if such handgun was provided by the peace officer;

(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries, jails and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense;

(3) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the Illinois National Guard or the Reserve Officers Training Corps while in the performance of their official duties;

(4) Special Agents employed by a railroad or a public utility to perform police functions; guards of armored car companies; watchmen and security guards actually and regularly employed in the commercial or industrial operation for the protection of persons employed and private property related to such commercial or industrial operation;

(5) Agents and investigators of the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission authorized by the commission to carry such weapons;

(6) Licensed gun collectors;

(footnote continued)

within the Village's borders. The district court held that the Ordinance was constitutional. We affirm.

I

Victor D. Quilici initially challenged Ordinance No. 81-11 in state court. Morton Grove removed the action to federal court where it was consolidated with two similar actions, one brought by George L. Reichert and Robert E. Metler (collectively Reichert) and one brought by Robert Stengl, Martin Gutenkauf, Alice Gutenkauf, Walter J. Dutchak and Geoffrey Lagonia (collectively Stengl). Plaintiffs alleged that Ordinance #81-11 violated article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution and

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(footnote continued)

(7) Licensed gun clubs provided the gun club has premises from which it operates and maintains possession and control of handguns used by its members, and has procedures and facilities for keeping such handguns in a safe place, under the control of the club's chief officer, at all times when they are not being used for target shooting or other sporting or recreational purposes at the premises of the gun club; and gun club members while such members are using their handguns at the gun club premises;

(8) A possession of an antique firearm;

(9) Transportation of handguns to those persons authorized under Subparagraphs 1 through 8 of this subsection to possess handguns, if the handguns are broken down in a non-functioning state or not immediately accessible.

(10) Transportation of handguns by persons from a licensed gun club to another licensed gun club or transportation from a licensed gun club to a gun club outside the limits of Morton Grove; provided however that the transportation is for the purpose of engaging in competitive target shooting or for the purpose of permanently keeping said handgun at such new gun club; and provided further that at all times during such transportation said handgun shall have trigger locks securely fastened to the handgun.

the second, ninth and fourteen amendments of the United States Constitution. They sought an order declaring the Ordinance unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Morton Grove's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment.

In its opinion, *Quilici* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, 532 F.Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the district court set forth several reasons for upholding the handgun ban's validity under the state and federal constitutions. First, it held that the Ordinance which banned only certain kinds of arms was a valid exercise of Morton Grove's police power and did not conflict with section 22's conditional right to keep and bear arms. Second, relying on *Presser* v. *Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), the court concluded that the second amendment's guarantee of the right to bear arms has not been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and, therefore, is inapplicable to Morton Grove. Finally, it stated that the ninth amendment does not include the right to possess handguns for self-defense. Appellants contend that the district court incorrectly construed the relevant constitutional provisions, assigning numerous errors based on case law, historical analysis, common law traditions and public policy concerns.[2]

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[2] Three amici briefs were also filed, by the Illinois State Rifle Association, the Handgun Control, Inc., and the States of Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon and Wyoming collectively. We have considered the arguments raised in these briefs and find that, for the most part, they raise the same arguments as those raised by the parties.

However, the states' amici curiae brief raises one issue not raised by the parties or addressed by the district court. The states argue

(footnote continued)

While we recognize that this case raises controversial issues which engender strong emotions, our task is to apply the law as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, regardless of whether that Court's interpretation comports with various personal views of what the law should be. We are also aware that we must resolve the controversy without rendering unnecessary constitutional decisions. *Richard Nixon* v. *A. Ernest Fitzgerald*, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1982). With these principles in mind we address appellants' contentions.

II

We consider the state constitutional issue first. The Illinois Constitution provides:

(footnote continued)

that the district court should have abstained because the federal court may not construe a state constitutional provision when the state court has not yet had the opportunity to construe that provision. Amici Curiae br. at 8. The states admit that abstention is not required when the state constitutional provision parallels the federal constitutional provision. However, relying on *Railroad Comm'n* v. *Pullman Co.*, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), they assert that the state constitutional provision involved in this case is unique, and thus, the federal court should not have prematurely usurped the state's prerogative to interpret its own constitution.

We disagree. Since abstention is not mandatory, the federal court must determine whether abstention is appropriate in a particular case. 1A Moore's Federal Practice § 0.203[1] at 2105 (1977). Federal courts have been reluctant to abstain when fundamental rights such as voting, racial equality or rights of expression are involved. *Id.* at 2111-12. We consider the issue of gun control of vital importance to every citizen and, for this reason, do not believe that abstention is any more appropriate in this case than in cases where fundamental rights are involved. Moreover, the purpose of the abstention doctrine is to minimize the conflict between the federal and state systems. *Railroad Comm'n* v. *Pullman Co.*, 312 U.S. 496 (1941). There is no conflict here, for Morton Grove voluntarily removed this case to federal court. Accordingly, we find that the abstention doctrine has no relevance.

> Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

Ill. Const. art. I, § 22. The parties agree that the meaning of this section is controlled by the terms "arms" and "police power" but disagree as to the scope of these terms.

Relying on the statutory construction principles that constitutional guarantees should be broadly construed and that constitutional provisions should prevail over conflicting statutory provisions, appellants allege that section 22's guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms prohibits a complete ban of any one kind of arm. They argue that the constitutional history of section 22 establishes that the term "arms" includes those weapons commonly employed for "recreation or the protection of person and property," 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 87 (Proceedings), and contend that handguns have consistently been used for these purposes.

Appellants concede that the phrase "subject to the police power" does not prohibit reasonable regulation of arms. Thus, they admit that laws which require the licensing of guns or which restrict the carrying of concealed weapons or the possession of firearms by minors, convicted felons, and incompetents are valid. However, they maintain that no authority supports interpreting section 22 to permit a ban on the possession of handguns merely because alternative weapons are not also banned. They argue that construing section 22 in this manner would lead to the anomalous situation in which one municipality completely bans handguns while a neighboring municipality completely bans all arms but handguns.

In contrast, Morton Grove alleges that "arms" is a general term which does not include any specific kind of weapon. Relying on section 22's language, which they

characterize as clear and explicit, Morton Grove reads section 22 to guarantee the right to keep only some, but not all, arms which are used for "recreation or the protection of person and property." It argues that the Ordinance passes constitutional muster because standard rifles and shotguns are also used for "recreation or the protection of person and property" and Ordinance ±81-11 does not ban these weapons.

While Morton Grove does not challenge appellants' assertion that "arms" includes handguns, we believe that a discussion of the kind of arms section 22 protects is an appropriate place to begin our analysis. Because we disagree with Morton Grove's assertion that section 22's language is clear and explicit, we turn to the constitutional debates for guidance on the proper construction of arms.[3] *Client Follow-Up Co.* v. *Hynes*, 75 Ill. 2d 208, 216, 390 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1979), citing *Wolfson* v. *Avery*, 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).[4]

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[3] In construing section 22, the district court also relied heavily on the constitutional debates. Appellants challenge this reliance, arguing that constitutional ambiguities are best resolved by the voters' understanding at the time of the vote on the proposed constitution. Appellants contend that the voters' understanding should be gleaned from: (1) the Official Explanation published prior to the ratification vote; (2) newspaper articles discussing the proposed section 22; and (3) the meaning which the voters were likely to have attributed to the term "police power." Since the district court thoroughly analyzed, and properly rejected, this theory of statutory construction, *Quilici* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, 532 F. Supp at 1174-75, we need not repeat that analysis here.

[4] Reichert cites *Client Follow-Up Co.* v. *Hynes*, 75 Ill.2d 208, 390 N.E.2d 847 (1979) to support his assertion that the district court erroneously relied on the constitutional convention debates to construe section 22. He contends that *Client Follow-Up* holds

(footnote continued)

The debates indicate that the category of arms protected by section 22 is not limited to military weapons; the framers also intended to include those arms that "law-abiding persons commonly employ[ed]" for "recreation or the protection of person and property." 6 Proceedings 87. Handguns are undisputedly the type of arms commonly used for "recreation or the protection of person and property."

Our conclusion that the framers intended to include handguns in the class of protected arms is supported by the fact that in discussing the term the Proceedings refer to *People* v. *Brown*, 253 Mich. 537, 541-42, 235 N.W. 245, 246-47 (1931) and *State* v. *Duke*, 42 Tex. 455, 458 (1875). *Brown* defines weapons as those "relied upon . . . for defense or pleasure," including "ordinary guns" and "revolvers." 253 Mich. at 542, 235 N.W. at 247. *Duke* states that "[t]he arms which every person is secured the right to keep and bear (in defense of himself or the State, subject to legislative regulation), must be such arms as are commonly kept, . . . and are appropriate for . . . self-defense, as well as such as are proper for the defense of the State." 42 Tex. at 458. The delegates' statements and reliance on *Brown* and *Duke* convinces us that the term arms in section 22 includes handguns.

Having determined that section 22 includes handguns within the class of arms protected, we must now determine the extent to which a municipality may exercise

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(footnote continued)

that constitutional convention debates are useful only when those debates demonstrate a consensus among the delegates. Reichert correctly states the *Client Follow-Up* holding, but ignores the fact that the Proceedings indicate a majority consensus among the delegates as to the meaning of section 22. *See, e.g.*, 3 Proceedings 1711, 1717-19, 1818.

its police power to restrict, or even prohibit, the right to keep and bear these arms. The district court concluded that section 22 recognizes only a narrow individual right which is subject to substantial legislative control. It noted that "[t]o the extent that one looks to the convention debate for assistance in reconciling the conflict between the right to arms and the exercise of the police power, the debate clearly supports a narrow construction of the individual right." *Quilici* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, 532 F. Supp. at 1174. It further noted that while the Proceedings cite some cases holding that the state's police power should be read restrictively, those cases were decided under "distinctly different constitutional provisions" and, thus, have little application to this case. *Id.* at 1176.

We agree with the district court that the right to keep and bear arms in Illinois is so limited by the police power that a ban on handguns does not violate that right. In reaching this conclusion we find two factors significant. First, section 22's plain language grants only the right to keep and bear arms, not handguns. Second, although the framers intended handguns to be one of the arms conditionally protected under section 22, they also envisioned that local governments might exercise their police power to restrict, or prohibit, the right to keep and bear handguns. For example, Delegate Foster, speaking for the majority, explained:

> It could be argued that, in theory, the legislature now [prior to the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution] has the right to ban all firearms in the state as far as individual citizens owning them is concerned. That is the power which we wanted to restrict—an absolute ban on all firearms.

3 Proceedings 1688. Delegate Foster then noted that section 22 "would prevent a complete ban on all guns,

but there could be a ban on certain categories." *Id.* at 1693.[5] It is difficult to imagine clearer evidence that section 22 was intended to permit a municipality to ban handguns if it so desired.

Appellants argue that construing section 22 to protect only some unspecified categories of arms, thereby allowing municipalities to exercise their police power to enact dissimilar gun control laws, leads to "untenable" and "absurd" results. Quilici br. at 14. This argument ignores the fact that the Illinois Constitution authorizes local governments to function as home rule units to "exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs". Illinois Const. art. VIII, § 6(a). Home rule government[6] is based on the the-

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[5] The Proceedings are replete with other statements supporting our holding. See, for example, Delegate Foster's statement that "we feel that under . . . [section 22] . . . the state would have the right to prohibit some classes of firearms, such as war weapons, handguns, or some other category." 3 Proceedings 1818. See also his statement immediately prior to the vote on the proposed section 22 that: "[i]t is the position of the majority that under the police power of the state, the legislature would have the authority, for example, to forbid all handguns . . . [and] it is still the position of the majority that short of an absolute and complete ban on the possession of all firearms, this provision would leave the legislature free to regulate the use of firearms in Illinois." 3 Proceedings 1718.

[6] Ill. Const. art. VII, § 6(a) provides:

> A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the county and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are home rule units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become home rule units. Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate

(footnote continued)

ory that local governments are in the best position to assess the needs and desires of the community and, thus, can most wisely enact legislation addressing local concerns. *Carlson* v. *Briceland*, 61 Ill. App. 3d 247, 377 N.E.2d 1138 (1978). Illinois home rule units have expansive powers to govern as they deem proper, *see generally* Hall & Wallack, *Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Transfer of Powers*, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 775, 777-79; Vitullo & Peters, *Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Municipal Insurance Crisis*, 30 DePaul L. Rev. 325, 326-29 (1981); including the authority to impose greater restrictions on particular rights than those imposed by the state. *See City of Evanston* v. *Create, Inc.*, 85 Ill. 2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981). The only limits on their autonomy are those imposed by the Illinois Constitution, *City of Carbondale ex rel. Ham* v. *Eckert*, 76 Ill. App. 3d 881, 395 N.E.2d 607 (1979), or by the Illinois General Assembly exercising its authority to pre-empt home rule in specific instances. Because we have concluded that the Illinois Constitution permits a ban on certain categories of arms, home rule units such as Morton Grove may properly enact different, even inconsistent, arms restrictions. This is precisely the kind of local control envisioned by the new Illinois Constitution.

Appellants concede that municipalities may, under the Illinois Constitution, exercise their police power to enact regulations which prohibit "possession of items legislatively found to be dangerous . . .", Quilici br. at 9.

(footnote continued)

for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax and to incur debt.

The parties do not dispute the fact that Morton Grove is a home rule unit and the court notes that, in 1980, Morton Grove passed a referendum maintaining its home rule status pursuant to Ill. Const. Art. VII, § 6(a).

They draw a distinction, however, between the exercise of the police power in general and the exercise of police power with respect to a constitutionally protected right. Indeed, they vehemently insist that a municipality may not exercise its police power to completely prohibit a constitutional guarantee.

We agree that the state may not exercise its police power to violate a positive constitutional mandate, *People* v. *Warren*, 11 Ill. 2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28 (1957), but we reiterate that section 22 simply prohibits an absolute ban on all firearms. Since Ordinance No. 81-11 does not prohibit all firearms, it does not prohibit a constitutionally protected right. There is no right under the Illinois Constitution to possess a handgun, nor does the state have an overriding state interest in gun control which requires it to retain exclusive control in order to prevent home rule units from adopting conflicting enactments. *See City of Evanston* v. *Create, Inc.*, 85 Ill.2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981). Accordingly, Morton Grove may exercise its police power to prohibit handguns even though this prohibition interferes with an individual's liberty or property. *People* v. *Warren*, 11 Ill.2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28 (1957).

The Illinois Constitution establishes a presumption in favor of municipal home rule. *Carlson* v. *Briceland*, 61 Ill. App. 3d 247, 377 N.E.2d 1138 (1978). Once a local government identifies a problem and enacts legislation to mitigate or eliminate it, that enactment is presumed valid and may be overturned only if it is unreasonable, clearly arbitrary, and has no foundation in the police power. *Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n* v. *Block*, 75 Ill.2d 443, 389 N.E.2d 529 (1979); *People* v. *Copeland*, 92 Ill. App. 3d 475, 415 N.E.2d 1173 (1st Dist. 1980). Thus, it is not the province of this court

to pass judgment on the merits of Ordinance No. 81-11; our task is simply to determine whether Ordinance No. 81-11's restrictions are rationally related to its stated goals. *People ex rel. Difanis* v. *Barr*, 83 Ill.2d 191, 414 N.E.2d 731 (1980). As the district court noted, there is at least some empirical evidence that gun control legislation may reduce the number of deaths and accidents caused by handguns. *Quilici* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, 532 F. Supp. at 1179. This evidence is sufficient to sustain the conclusion that Ordinance No. 81-11 is neither wholly arbitrary nor completely unsupported by any set of facts. *People* v. *Copeland*, 92 Ill. App. 3d 475, 415 N.E.2d 1173 (1st Dist. 1980). Accordingly, we decline to consider plaintiffs' arguments that Ordinance No. 81-11 will not make Morton Grove a safer, more peaceful place.

We agree with the district court that Ordinance No. 81-11: (1) is properly directed at protecting the safety and health of Morton Grove citizens; (2) is a valid exercise of Morton Grove's police power; and (3) does not violate any of appellants' rights guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.[7]

III

We next consider whether Ordinance No. 81-11 violates the second amendment to the United States Constitution. While appellants all contend that Ordinance No. 81-11 is invalid under the second amendment, they offer slightly different arguments to substantiate this contention. All argue, however, that the second amendment applies to state and local governments and that the second

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[7] We note that *Kalodimos* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, 81 Ch. 6424 slip op. (Cook County, Ill. Jan. 29, 1982) in which Reichert was one of several plaintiffs, is consistent with our analysis here.

amendment guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms exists, not only to assist in the common defense, but also to protect the individual. While reluctantly conceding that *Presser* v. *Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), held that the second amendment applied only to action by the federal government, they nevertheless assert that *Presser* also held that the right to keep and bear arms is an attribute of natural citizenship which is not subject to state restriction. Reichert br. at 36. Finally, apparently responding to the district court's comments that "[p]laintiffs . . . have not suggested that the Morton Grove Ordinance in any way interferes with the ability of the United States to maintain public security . . ." *Quilici* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, 532 F. Supp. at 1169, Quilici and Reichert argue in this court that the Morton Grove Ordinance interferes with the federal government's ability to maintain public security by preventing individuals from defending themselves and the community from "external or internal armed threats." Quilici br. at 12; Reichert br. at 37-38. These are the same arguments made in the district court. Accordingly, we comment only briefly on the points already fully analyzed in that court's decision.

As we have noted, the parties agree that *Presser* is controlling, but disagree as to what *Presser* held. It is difficult to understand how appellants can assert that *Presser* supports the theory that the second amendment right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right which the state cannot regulate when the *Presser* decision plainly states that "[t]he Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed, but this . . . means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the National government. . . ." *Presser* v. *Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). As the district court explained in detail, appellants' claim that *Presser* supports the proposition that the second amendment guarantee of the right to

keep and bear arms is not subject to state restriction is based on dicta quoted out of context. *Quilici* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, 532 F.Supp. at 1181-82. This argument borders on the frivolous and does not warrant any further consideration.

Apparently recognizing the inherent weakness of their reliance on *Presser*, appellants urge three additional arguments to buttress their claim that the second amendment applies to the states. They contend that: (1) *Presser* is no longer good law because later Supreme Court cases incorporating other amendments into the fourteenth amendment have effectively overruled *Presser*. Reichert br. at 52; (2) *Presser* is illogical, Quilici br. at 12; and (3) the entire Bill of Rights has been implicitly incorporated into the fourteenth amendment to apply to the states, Reichert br. at 48-52.

None of these arguments has merit. First, appellants offer no authority, other than their own opinions, to support their arguments that *Presser* is no longer good law or would have been decided differently today. Indeed, the fact that the Supreme Court continues to cite *Presser*, *Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n.8 (1964), leads to the opposite conclusion. Second, regardless of whether appellants agree with the *Presser* analysis, it is the law of the land and we are bound by it. Their assertion that *Presser* is illogical is a policy matter for the Supreme Court to address. Finally, their theory of implicit incorporation is wholly unsupported. The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the proposition that the entire Bill of Rights applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. *Adamson* v. *California*, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), *overruled on other grounds*, *Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1

(1964); *Palko* v. *Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); *Twining* v. *New Jersey*, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

Since we hold that the second amendment does not apply to the states, we need not consider the scope of its guarantee of the right to bear arms. For the sake of completeness, however, and because appellants devote a large portion of their briefs to this issue, we briefly comment on what we believe to be the scope of the second amendment.

The second amendment provides that "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II. Construing this language according to its plain meaning, it seems clear that the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the preservation of a militia. This is precisely the manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the second amendment in *United States* v. *Miller*, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the only Supreme Court case specifically addressing that amendment's scope. There the Court held that the right to keep and bear arms extends only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a well regulated militia.

In an attempt to avoid the *Miller* holding that the right to keep and bear arms exists only as it relates to protecting the public security, appellants argue that "[t]he fact that the right to keep and bear arms is joined with language expressing one of its purposes in no way permits a construction which limits or confines the exercise of that right." Reichert br. at 35. They offer no explanation for how they have arrived at this conclusion. Alternatively, they argue that handguns are mil-

itary weapons.[8] Stengl's br. at 11-13. Our reading of *Miller* convinces us that it does not support either of these theories. As the Village correctly notes, appellants are essentially arguing that *Miller* was wrongly decided and should be overruled. Such arguments have no place before this court. Under the controlling authority of *Miller* we conclude that the right to keep and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the second amendment.[9]

Because the second amendment is not applicable to Morton Grove and because possession of handguns by individuals is not part of the right to keep and bear arms, Ordinance No. 81-11 does not violate the second amendment.

IV

Finally, we consider whether Ordinance No. 81-11 violates the ninth amendment. Appellants argue that, although the right to use commonly-owned arms for self-defense is not explicitly listed in the Bill of Rights, it is a fundamental right protected by the ninth amendment. Citing no authority which directly supports their contention, they rely on the debates in the First Congress and the writings of legal philosophers to establish that the

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[8] Appellants devote a portion of their briefs to historical analysis of the development of English common law and the debate surrounding the adoption of the second and fourteenth amendments. This analysis has no relevance on the resolution of the controversy before us. Accordingly, we decline to comment on it, other than to note that we do not consider individually owned handguns to be military weapons.

[9] A similar conclusion has been reached by numerous other courts. *United States* v. *Oakes*, 564 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); *United States* v. *Warin*, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); *Cody* v. *United States*, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); *Stevens* v. *United States*, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971).

right of an individual to own and possess firearms for self-defense is an absolute and inalienable right which cannot be impinged.

Since appellants do not cite, and our research has not revealed, any Supreme Court case holding that any specific right is protected by the ninth amendment, appellants' argument has no legal significance. Appellants may believe the ninth amendment should be read to recognize an unwritten, fundamental, individual right to own or possess firearms; the fact remains that the Supreme Court has never embraced this theory.[10]

V

Reasonable people may differ about the wisdom of Ordinance No. 81-11. History may prove that the Ordinance cannot effectively promote peace and security for Morton Grove's citizens. Such issues, however, are not before the court. We simply hold the Ordinance No. 81-11 is a proper exercise of Morton Grove's police power and does not violate art. I, § 22 of the Illinois Constitution or the second, ninth, or fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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[10] Appellants also argued, in the district court, that Ordinance No. 81-11 violated the fifth amendment and is unconstitutionally vague. These arguments were not raised in this court.

COFFEY, *Circuit Judge*, dissenting.

The constitutions of the United States and the respective states define and delineate the powers of our various governmental units. As a fundamental principle, if a governing body (federal, state or local) should at any time overstep its limits the judiciary must act as a constitutional check. This was the intent of the framers of the Constitution as evidenced by their dividing the powers and responsibilities of the government into three separate and distinct branches. Specifically, if a legislative body enacts a law exceeding the constitutional limits of its authority, it is the responsibility and the duty of an independent judiciary to declare it void.

With this principle in mind and conscious of the magnitude of the political and social implications of this case, I am compelled to dissent from my brethren today. It is my opinion that the Village of Morton Grove has improperly legislated beyond the legitimate parameters of its authority.

I base my conclusion upon three grounds. First, Morton Grove Ordinance No. 81-11 is an impermissible attempt by the governing body of the Village to address an issue which the people of the State of Illinois through their elected representatives have deemed to be a matter properly resolved by state action. The state's long-standing and comprehensive regulation and prohibition of handgun possession preempts local legislation on the subject. Second, and closely related to the first, I believe that the Ordinance is invalid under the home rule provisions of the Illinois Constitution in that the regulation of handgun possession is a matter of statewide rather than local concern and the Morton Grove Ordinance contradicts state law regarding the possession of handguns. Third, I believe that Morton Grove Ordinance No. 81-11,

as a matter of constitutional law, impermissibly interferes with individual privacy rights. I join others who throughout history have recognized that an individual in this country has a protected right, within the confines of the criminal law, to guard his or her home or place of business from unlawful intrusions. In my view, today's majority decision marks a new nadir for the fundamental principle that "a man's home is his castle." It has been said that the greatest threat to our liberty is from well-meaning, and almost imperceptible governmental incroachments upon our personal freedom. Today's decision sanctions an intrusion on our basic rights as citizens which would no doubt be alarming and odious to our founding fathers. For the above-cited reasons, which I shall discuss in greater detail herein, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of this court.

I.

The Village of Morton Grove's Ordinance No. 81-11 is invalid as the law is an improper attempt by the locality to address a subject which has been deemed by the Illinois Legislature to be exclusively a matter of state concern and control. The state legislature, through extensive and long-standing regulation, has preempted the subject of handgun possession.

Although most frequently addressed in the context of federal versus state enactments, the doctrine of preemption has been recognized as also being applicable to situations involving duplicate areas of state and local legislation. The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that the existence of long-standing and extensive state regulation of a certain subject matter evidences an implied intent to preempt that field to the exclusion of local municipalities. In *Impersand, Inc.* v. *Finley*, 61 Ill.2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court

acknowledged and approved the following examples contained in the Record of the Proceedings of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention:

> "'Home Rule County adopts an ordinance providing for limits upon rates of interest that may be charged on mortgage and other loans to residents of the county. This ordinance is not valid. The interest-control ordinance is not included in the home-rule powers granted by [section 6(a)] *because of the extensive federal and state regulation of credit institutions.*'
>
> • • •
>
> 'Home Rule City adopts an ordinance limiting the rates that may be charged by the telephone company for local calls. *Long-standing state regulation of utility rates precludes this subject from being considered a matter pertaining to home-rule government and affairs.*'"

Id. 338 N.E.2d at 17 (emphasis added).

The Illinois Appellate Court has also recognized that "where the legislature has adopted a scheme for regulation of a given subject, local legislative control over such phases of the subject as are covered by state regulation ceases." *Hutchcraft Van Serv.* v. *City of Urbana, Etc.*, 104 Ill.App.3d 817, 433 N.E.2d 329, 333 (1982).[1] The *Hutchcraft* court held that "the legislature has preempted the subject of freedom from unlawful discrimination." *Id.* at 334. In so deciding, the court emphasized that it "would be hard-put to envision a more comprehensive statutory scheme than that contained in the Illinois Human Rights Act." *Id.* Similarly, the subject of the prohibition of handgun possession has been impliedly preempted by the Illinois Legislature because one would

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[1] On October 5, 1982, the Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for leave to appeal the *Hutchcraft* decision, Illinois Supreme Court Docket No. 56635.

be "hard-put to envision a more comprehensive statutory scheme than that" set forth in the state statutes on the subject of handgun possession.

The Illinois Legislature, when enacting and amending chapter 38, set forth an extensive scheme, applying to all persons in Illinois, regulating who may possess firearms, when and where they may possess firearms and the types of firearms they may possess. Possession of a handgun or other firearm by a minor, felon, drug addict or mentally ill or retarded person is forbidden by Illinois statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-3.1.[2] Chapter 38, § 24-1(a)(10) of the Illinois statutes already prohibits possession of a handgun

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[2] Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-3.1 provides in pertinent part:

"24-3.1. Unlawful possession of firearms and firearm ammunition.

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful possession of firearms or firearm ammunition when:

(1) He is under 18 years of age and has in his possession any firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person.

(2) He is under 21 years of age, has been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a traffic offense or adjudged delinquent and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession; or

(3) He has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this or any other jurisdiction within 5 years from release from the penitentiary or within 5 years of conviction if penitentiary sentence has not been imposed, and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession; or

(4) He is a narcotic addict and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession; or

(5) He has been a patient in a mental hospital within the past 5 years and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession; or

(6) He is mentally retarded and has any firearms or firearm ammunition in his possession; or

* * *"

by a person on a public street, alley or public lands[3] and the carrying of a concealed handgun under certain circumstances is proscribed by Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(4).[4] Additionally, it is a violation of state law to possess a firearm in an establishment licensed to sell liquor, wine or beer.[5] Moreover, the legislature has banned

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[3] Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(10) recites:

"Unlawful Use of Weapons. (a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

* * *

(10) Carries or possesses on or about his person, upon any public street, alley, or other public lands within the corporate limits of a city, village or incorporated town, except when an invitee thereon or therein, for the purpose of the display of such weapon or the lawful commerce in weapons, or except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm."

[4] Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(4) states:

"§ 24-1. Unlawful Use of Weapons. (a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

* * *

(4) Carries or possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; or

* * *"

[5] Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(8) states:

"§ 24.1. Unlawful Use of Weapons. (a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

* * *

(8) Carries or possesses any firearm, stun gun or taser or other deadly weapon in any place which is licensed to sell intoxicating beverages, or at any public gathering held pursuant to a license issued by any governmental body or any public gathering at which an admission is charged, excluding a place where a showing, demonstration or lecture involving the exhibition of unloaded firearms is conducted; or

* * *"

the possession of specific types of firearms (i.e., machine guns and sawed-off shotgun) in all circumstances but has refrained from enacting such a categorical prohibition of handgun possession.[6]

As recognized by the majority, consideration was given to the issue of firearm possession at Illinois' Sixth Constitutional Convention. It is clear from a review of the transcript of the debates that it was the *state's* police power vis-a-vis firearm possession which was the subject of debate. It was noted that Article I, section 22 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution allows the state legislature considerable discretion in the regulation and prohibition of firearm use and possession. It is pursuant to this authority that the State of Illinois enacted and enforces the extensive provisions of chapter 38. Where the legislature after due deliberation has seen fit to outlaw the possession of handguns it has done so. The statutes discussed above constitute the Illinois Legislature's comprehensive promulgation of mandates concerning the issue of gun possession which: (1) prohibits minors, felons, drug ad-

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[6] Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(7) provides:

"§ 24-1. Unlawful Use of Weapons. (a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

* * *

(7) Sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries any weapon from which 8 or more shots or bullets may be discharged by a single function of the firing device, any shotgun having one or more barrels less than 18 inches in length, sometimes called a sawed-off shotgun, or any weapon made from a shotgun whether by alteration, modification or otherwise, if such weapon, as modified or altered, has an overall length of less than 26 inches, or a barrel length of less than 18 inches or any bomb, bombshell, grenade, bottle or other container containing an explosive substance of over one-quarter ounce for like purposes, such as, but not limited to, black powder bombs and Molotov cocktails or artillery projectiles; or

* * *"

dicts and mentally ill and retarded persons from possessing any firearms; (2) proscribes firearms possession on public streets and alleys and in public places; (3) forbids the carrying of a concealed weapon under certain circumstances; (4) prohibits possession of a firearm in a place licensed to sell alcoholic beverages; (5) prohibits without exclusion the possession of a machine gun or a sawed-off shotgun; and (6) expressly authorizes possession of a handgun within the confines of one's home or fixed place of business.

A locality such as Morton Grove may address a matter of public concern, such as handgun prohibition, only if the Illinois Legislature has not revealed, either expressly or by implication, an intention to occupy the field to the exclusion of all local legislation. The subject of the prohibition of firearm possession has been so extensively and comprehensively addressed in the Illinois Statutes as to impliedly indicate a positive legislative intent to exclusively occupy the field. Therefore, Illinois municipalities are precluded from enacting provisions prohibiting handgun possession.

Further support for the proposition that the Illinois Legislature intended to peremptorily address the issue of the prohibition of handguns and firearms is found when comparing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24 (addressed above) with Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 83. Section 24, known as the "Deadly Weapons Act," sets forth the qualifications for the lawful ownership and possession of firearms while section 83 directs owners of firearms to obtain "Firearm Owner's Identification Cards" issued by the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement. Section 83 contains a proviso authorizing municipalities to impose greater *restrictions* or *limitations* on firearms registration and

possession than those imposed by the legislature under section 83.[7]

Pursuant to section 83, a municipality can enact an ordinance reasonably restricting or confining the use and possession of firearms. A municipality can also require registration of firearm ownership. What the legislature has authorized is limited regulation of firearm possession by local units of government, but not prohibition. Section 83 does not allow a municipality such as Morton Grove to categorically prohibit handgun possession. To limit or restrict involves a circumscription which falls far short of an absolute prohibition.

> "The words 'prohibit' and 'restrict' are not synonymous. They are not alike in their meaning in their ordinary use. . . . 'To restrict is to restrain within bounds; to limit; to confine and does not mean to destroy or prohibit.' "

Forest Land Co. v. *Black*, 216 S.C. 255, 57 S.E.2d 420, 424 (1950).

If the intention of the Illinois Legislature had been to authorize local prohibition of handgun possession, such intention would have been clearly expressed as was the authorization of local regulation through restriction and limitation. As "[r]egulation is inconsistent with prohibition or exclusion," the proviso to section 83 does not minimize the implied intention of the legislature to ex-

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[7] Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 83-13.1 recites:

"Municipal Ordinance Imposing Greater Restrictions or Limitations

The provisions of any ordinance enacted by any municipality which requires registration or imposes greater restrictions or limitations on the acquisition, possession, and transfer of firearms than are imposed by this Act, are not invalidated or affected by this Act."

clusively address the issue of handgun possession under section 24. *See Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of Chicago*, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22, 25 (1929).

The Illinois Legislature, by enacting and amending the extensive provisions of chapter 38, has prohibited certain individuals from possessing firearms, forbidden possession of specific types of firearms and proscribed the possession of firearms in certain places. Despite the Illinois Legislature's refusal to prohibit handgun possession, Morton Grove has seen fit to disregard the legislative intent and has enacted a categorical ban on the possession of handguns, with limited exceptions. In light of long-standing and extensive state control of firearm ownership and possession, Morton Grove Ordinance No. 81-11 impermissibly addresses a subject matter designated by the Illinois Legislature to be the exclusive province of the state legislature.

II.

The powers of Illinois home rule units are not without limitation. The Illinois Constitution provides that a home rule unit, such as Morton Grove, may "exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs. . . ." Ill. Const. Art. VII, § 6(a). However, any exercise of home rule power by a municipality must be "concurrent" with state legislation in the area. Ill. Const. Art. VII, §6(i). Morton Grove's Ordinance No. 81-11 is invalid under the Illinois Constitution because the matter of handgun prohibition is not one solely pertaining to local government or local affairs and furthermore, the ordinance is repugnant to and is not concurrent with related state legislation.

Although the powers of home rule units are to be liberally construed, Illinois courts have invalidated or-

dinances which affected persons and governmental bodies outside the home rule unit. *See Landry* v. *Smith*, 66 Ill. App.3d 606, 384 N.E.2d 430, 433 (1978). Such a limitation on home rule authority was recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court in the *Ampersand* decision noted above.

> "[T]he question is not whether the 'pertaining to . . .' language should limit the home rule grant, but rather how extensive the limitation should be.
>
> The local government committee, explaining the intended extent of this limitation, stated in its report to the constitutional convention 'it is clear, however, *that the powers of home rule units relate to their own problems, not to those of the state or the nation.*' "

Ampersand, 338 N.E.2d at 17 (emphasis added).

In its *City of Des Plaines* v. *Chicago & N.W.Ry. Co.*, 65 Ill.2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976) decision, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a municipal noise pollution ordinance holding that it was legislation in an area which did not pertain to the government and affairs of the home rule unit. The *City of Des Plaines* court noted that although "noise pollution may initially appear to be a matter of local concern, an analysis of the problem reveals that noise pollution is a matter requiring regional, if not statewide, standards and controls." *Id.* 357 N.E.2d at 433. Of particular import to the *City of Des Plaines* court was "the question of noise emission from trains in transit which may pass through numerous municipalities en route to their destination." *Id.* at 435.

Practical considerations regarding the Morton Grove Ordinance show why handgun possession is properly a matter of statewide concern. Like the ordinance invalidated in *City of Des Plaines*, the Morton Grove Ordinance applies not only to residents of the Village, but also is applicable to non-residents traveling through the

Village.[8] The Ordinance is obviously designed to prohibit, with limited exceptions, possession of all handguns in Morton Grove whether by residents, non-residents, travelers, etc.

Under the Morton Grove Ordinance, a handgun owner must either take a circuitous route around the Village of Morton Grove or make arrangements to surrender his handgun to the police upon entering the Village and reacquire possession when he leaves.[9] Not only does this infringe upon the citizen's right to travel and, arguably, interfere with interstate commerce but it lends credence to the distinct possibility that gun control in Illinois will be no more than a crazy quilt of conflicting and unenforceable home rule ordinances. In this respect, it is important to remember that "a concomitant effect of this unenforceability is an erosive disrespect for the law which should not be tolerated."[10] Experience has taught mankind that the retention of unenforceable laws which are regularly violated breeds contempt for the law in general. Citizens must not be permitted to pick and choose which laws they wish to obey.

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[8] Ordinance No. 81-11 § 2(B) recites:

"No person shall possess, in the Village of Morton Grove the following:

* * *

(3) Any handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently inoperative."

[9] Illinois law permits a handgun owner to transport a handgun by car if the handgun is not immediately accessible to the driver or any other occupant of the vehicle. *See* Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 24-1(a)(4) and 24(2)(b)(4).

[10] *Peoples* v. *Abrahams*, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 286, 353 N.E.2d 574 (1976).

The majority opinion fails to recognize that the subject of handgun possession poses problems that transcend municipal boundaries and is thus not a local affair within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution. The majority flatly and cavalierly states that Illinois has "no overriding state interest in gun control which requires it to retain exclusive control in order to prevent home rule units from adopting conflicting enactments." To support this proposition, the majority relies without discussion on *City of Evanston* v. *Create, Inc.*, 85 Ill.2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981).

The *Create* decision, however, is inapposite to the instant case. In *Create*, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an Evanston landlord-tenant ordinance was a valid exercise of Evanston's home rule powers granted by the Illinois Constitution. Landlord-tenant ordinances are, by their very nature, matters of local concern since, like zoning ordinances, they apply exclusively to local residents and landowners. Such ordinances are enacted to be specifically suited to the unique needs of a locality's residents. The local governing body involved is keenly and uniquely aware of the needs of the community it serves. The landlord-tenant ordinance in *Create* had no impact on temporary or transitory visitors to Evanston. On the other hand, the Morton Grove handgun ordinance has a far broader scope in that it effects not only Morton Grove residents but also those citizens who merely pass through the Village.

That the prohibition of handgun possession is properly a matter of state concern can be further illustrated as follows: consider the political and administrative difficulties which would arise if Home-Rule Unit A were to pass an ordinance banning the possession of all handguns and Home-Rule Unit B were to pass an ordinance making handgun possession mandatory. What is outlawed in

one municipality becomes mandatory in another. The Illinois Legislature never intended to permit the possibility of a hodgepodge of conflicting home rule enactments when it adopted Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 to address the statewide issue of the prohibition of handgun ownership.

An analogy between the subject of gun control and the field of children's health care further highlights the propriety of statewide uniformity and enforcement. Due to difficulties in enforcement and the need for statewide uniformity, many states have passed legislation requiring the immunization of school age children against contagious diseases. *See, e.g.*, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111½ §§ 22.11 and 22.12. If local authorities were allowed to pass conflicting ordinances regarding the vaccination of school age children, the enforcement of these ordinances in multi-municipal school districts would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

The Illinois Legislature has not enacted a categorical prohibition of handgun possession, even though it was the view of the framers of the Illinois Constitution that firearm possession was a matter of statewide concern and that the state legislature had the power to ban handgun possession, if it so desired. In the debates at the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention which adopted the present Illinois Constitution, Delegate Foster, speaking for the majority explained:

> "We feel that . . . the state would have the right to prohibit some classes of firearms, such as war weapons, handguns, or some other category.
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> * * *
>
> [I]t is the position of the majority that under the police power of the state, the legislature would have the authority, for example, to forbid all handguns . . . [and] it is still the position of the majority that short of an absolute and complete ban on the posses-

> sion of all firearms, this provision would leave the legislature free to regulate the use of firearms in Illinois."

3 Proceedings of Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention at 1688, 1818 and 1718.

Delegate Foster's comments demonstrate that it was recognized by the Convention that firearm possession is a matter of state concern. Despite the clear meaning of Foster's words, the majority in the instant case concludes, based on the Delegate's remarks, that the framers of the Illinois Constitution "envisioned that *local governments* might exercise their police power to restrict, or prohibit, the right to keep and bear arms." (emphasis added). The fallacy of the majority's logic is obvious; Delegate Foster said that "the *state* would have the right to prohibit . . . handguns" and "that under the police power of the *state, the legislature* would have the authority, for example, to forbid all handguns. . . ." (emphasis added). In fact, Foster's remarks directly contradict, rather than support, the majority's conclusion that a local municipality such as Morton Grove may prohibit handgun possession; clearly, Foster's view was that handgun possession was a matter of statewide concern best addressed by state legislation.

The Morton Grove Ordinance prohibiting handgun possession is invalid because it does not act concurrently with the Illinois Legislature's extensive regulation of firearm registration and possession. Black's Law Dictionary defines "concurrent" as "united in agreement." Black's Law Dictionary 263 (5th Ed. 1979). Morton Grove's prohibition of handgun possession is not "united in agreement" with the state statutory scheme but is fundamentally at odds with the extensive state regulation of handgun possession. The state legislation is regulatory while Morton Grove's enactment is prohibitory.

The state legislature and the Morton Grove Ordinance approach the subject of gun control from opposite directions. The legislature started from the point that all persons may possess handguns and then proceeded to regulate and restrict specific types of guns, rather than banning handguns and then authorizing certain persons or classes to possess them. This reveals an implied intent to extend to all citizens a privilege to possess handguns except where, by operation of *state law*, that privilege is circumscribed in the interests of the common good. Morton Grove, in contrast, takes the opposite approach by prohibiting all handguns and then grants permission to possess handguns to limited classes of persons. Thus, the Morton Grove Ordinance is invalid as it is fundamentally at odds with the legislature's will to allow Illinois citizens to possess handguns, except in very limited circumstances, because "the test of concurrent authority . . . is the absence of conflict with the legislative will." *Maryland v. D.C. Rifle & Pistol Ass'n., Inc. v. Washington*, 442 F.2d 123, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

The second reason Morton Grove's Ordinance does not operate concurrently with state law is even more significant. The ordinance is invalid to the extent that it prohibits what is expressly permitted by state statute. "To be sure, a municipal regulation cannot permit an act which the statute forbids, or forbid an act which the statute permits." *Id.*

A number of sections of chapter 38 of the Illinois Statutes contain exceptions to the general provisions which ban the possession of handguns under certain circumstances. Of particular significance are those statutory sections which expressly allow for the possession of handguns by individuals when in their homes, in their fixed places of business or upon their land.[11] The Illinois Legis

[11] *See, e.g.*, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 24-1(a)(40), (10).

lature has expressly authorized the citizens of Illinois to carry handguns while present in certain locations. Such authorization is directly nullified by Morton Grove Ordinance No. 81-11.

A municipal ordinance providing for the registration of firearms was attacked in *Brown* v. *City of Chicago*, 42 Ill.2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129 (1969). Although the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the legislature had not preempted the registration aspect of the subject of gun control, the court did note that the ordinance would be struck down if it contradicted the provisions of the statute. The registration ordinance was upheld because there was "no inconsistency or repugnancy" between it and statutory provisions relating to firearm ownership registration. *Id.* at 250 N.E.2d 129. There can be no doubt as to the repugnancy of Morton Grove Ordinance No. 81-11 as it directly contradicts an authorization recited in the state statutes. Additionally, the ordinance is inconsistent with the state regulatory scheme as prohibition is inconsistent with regulation. I would find no problem with Morton Grove requiring handgun registration similar to that involved in *Brown*. Registration and prohibition, by their very nature, seek to achieve different goals. Regulation through registration allows possession subject to reasonable limits while prohibition mandates an outright ban on possession.

As Morton Grove has impermissibly acted under its home rule powers vis-a-vis Ordinance No. 81-11, it is the obligation of this court to strike down the municipal enactment. Clearly, the creation of a *uniform* regulatory scheme concerning the possession of handguns is a matter of statewide, or even federal concern, which should not be disrupted by permitting this type of contradictory local action.

III.

I find today's decision particularly disturbing as it sanctions governmental action which I feel impermissibly interferes with basic human freedoms. I cannot let this opportunity pass without expressing my concern with the erosion of these rights.

The majority cavalierly dismisses the argument that the right to possess commonly owned arms for self-defense and the protection of loved ones is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Justice Cardozo in *Palko* v. *Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), defined fundamental rights as those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Surely nothing could be more fundamental to the "concept of *ordered* liberty " than the basic right of an individual, within the confines of the criminal law, to protect his home and family from unlawful and dangerous intrusions.

Article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution provides that subject to the "police power," the right of an individual to bear arms shall not be infringed. The United States Supreme Court has noted the difficulty in attempting to outline the parameters of a state's legitimate police power. In *Berman* v. *Parker*, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), addressing the concept of "police power," the Supreme Court stated that "an attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts." *Id.* at 33. The term is neither "abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition." *Id.* In enacting Ordinance No. 81-11, Morton Grove has gone beyond the "outer limits" of its legitimate police powers.

In *Haller Sign Works* v. *Physical Culture Training School*, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911), the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that it is the responsibility of the courts to determine when constitutional limits have

been exceeded in the enactment of police power legislation. It is the duty of the courts to determine whether there has been an "unreasonable invasion of private rights." *Id.* at 922.

> "Necessarily there are limits beyond which legislation cannot constitutionally go in depriving individuals of their natural rights and liberties. To determine where the rights of the individual end and those of the public begin is a question which must be determined by the court."

Id. 94 N.E. at 927.

In today's decision this court has refused to take cognizance of the natural right of an individual, within the confines of the criminal law, to protect his home and family from unlawful and dangerous intrusions. It is my opinion that Morton Grove Ordinance No. 81-11 impermissibly interferes with the rights of Illinois citizens to guard their personal security, subject to the limits of the criminal law, and that it is the duty of this court to so declare.

The court today has also refused to recognize the tremendous impact of Morton Grove Ordinance No. 81-11 on personal privacy rights. There is no doubt that the right to one's privacy is afforded constitutional protection. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a right to privacy implicit in the federal constitution and Article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution expressly establishes a right to privacy. The Illinois provision has been interpreted by some members of the Illinois Supreme Court as creating a direct right to freedom from invasions of privacy by government or public officials. *See Stein* v. *Howlett*, 52 Ill.2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409, 411, *appeal dismissed*, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).

The Morton Grove Ordinance, by prohibiting the possession of a handgun within the confines of the home, violates both the fundamental right to privacy and the fundamental right to defend the home against unlawful intrusion within the parameters of the criminal law. There is no area of human activity more protected by the right to privacy than the right to be free from unnecessary government intrusion in the confines of the home.

The unique importance of the home from time immemorial has been amply demonstrated in our constitutional jurisprudence. Among the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights are the Third Amendment's prohibition of quartering of troops in a private house in peacetime and the right of citizens to be "secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . ." guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. As early as 1886, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment protects against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." *Boyd* v. *United States*, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The First Amendment had been held to encompass the right to "privacy and freedom of association in the home." *Moreno* v. *United States Dep't of Agriculture*, 345 F.Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972), *aff'd*, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).

In *Stanley* v. *Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Supreme Court overturned a state conviction for possession of obscene material, holding "that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making the private possession of obscene material a crime." The Supreme Court had previously held that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment, but in *Stanley* the Court made a distinction between commercial distribution of obscene matter and the private possession of such materials in the home and held the Georgia statute unconstitutional because it prohib-

ited the possession of such materials in the home. The Court recited:

> "For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into ones privacy."

Id. at 564.[12]

The Court has made it clear that its *Stanley* decision was not based on the idea that obscene matter is itself protected under the right of privacy. Rather, the focus in *Stanley* was on the fact that the activity prohibited by the Georgia statute occurred in the privacy of the home. In *United States* v. *Reidel*, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971), the Court rejected the argument that commercial distribution of pornography is constitutionally protected and held that the "focus" of *Stanley* was "on freedom of mind and thought and on the privacy of one's home." Subsequently, the Court in *United States* v. *Orito*, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) stated "the Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home" and there exists a "myriad" of activities which may be prohibited in public but which may be lawfully conducted within the privacy and confines of the home.

Most importantly, the Supreme Court in *Paris Adult Theatre I* v. *Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973), held that *Stanley* was decided "on the narrow basis of the 'privacy of the home' which was hardly more than a reaffirmation that '*a man's home is his castle.*'" (emphasis added).

Privacy in the home is a fundamental right under both the federal and Illinois Constitutions. This does not

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[12] I am aware of Justice Marshall's comments contained in footnote No. 11 of the *Stanley* decision. I believe however, as noted herein, that subsequent decisions of the Court have divested the footnote of any significance vis-a-vis this court's review of Morton Grove Ordinance No. 81-11.

mean, of course, that a person may do anything at anytime as long as the activity takes place within a person's home. Instead, the right to privacy is limited in two important respects. First, the Supreme Court strictly limited its *Stanley* holding to possession for purely private, noncommercial use in the home. Second, as noted in *Stanley*, the right to privacy must yield when it seriously interferes with the public welfare. The government bears a heavy burden when attempting to justify an expansion, as in gun control, of the "limited circumstances" in which intrusion into the privacy of a home is permitted.

Morton Grove has not met that heavy burden. Without question, the state may, should and has placed reasonable restrictions on the possession of handguns outside one's home to protect the public welfare. However, Morton Grove's prohibition of handgun possession within the confines of a person's own home has not been shown to be necessary to protect the public welfare and thus violates the fundamental right to privacy.

The right to privacy is one of the most cherished rights an American citizen has; the right to privacy sets America apart from totalitarian states in which the interests of the state prevail over individual rights. A fundamental part of our concept of ordered liberty is the right to protect one's home and family against dangerous intrusions subject to the criminal law. Morton Grove, acting like the omniscient and paternalistic "Big Brother" in George Orwell's novel, "1984", cannot, in the name of public welfare, dictate to its residents that they may not possess a handgun in the privacy of their home. To so prohibit the possession of handguns in the privacy of the home prevents a person from protecting his home

and family, endangers law-abiding citizens and renders meaningless the Supreme Court's teaching that "a man's home is his castle."

IV.

In summary, I believe a truly independent judiciary must exercise its powers with discretion and reservation, giving due deference to the other branches of government. Our judicial responsibility, however, obligates us to declare an act by another governmental unit to be void if we believe the enacted law is contrary to the principles of the Constitution. Because I believe that the Morton Grove Ordinance as enacted is contrary to the principles of the Constitution, I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of this court.

A true Copy:

Teste:

.....

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

VICTOR D. QUILICI,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,

Defendant.

ROBERT STENGL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

-vs-

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, et al.,

Defendants.

GEORGE L. REICHERT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

-vs-

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,

Defendant.

NOS. 81 C 3432, 81 C 4086, 81 C 5071 (Consolidated)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil action challenging the constitutionality of a gun control ordinance passed by the Trustees of the Village of Morton Grove. On June 8, 1981, the Morton Grove Board of Trustees enacted Ordinance #81-11, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Possession of Firearms and Other Dangerous Weapons." (A copy of the

ordinance is attached as an appendix.) In part, the ordinance provides that "no person shall possess, in the Village of Morton Grove . . . [a]ny handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently inoperative." The ordinance specifies various limited exceptions for certain individuals, such as peace officers, prison officials, and members of the armed forces and national guard. The ordinance also exempts licensed gun collectors and provides that handgun owners are free to retain their operative handguns for recreational use, as long as the guns are kept and used on the premises of licensed gun clubs and certain other rules are met. Violation of the ordinance is punishable by fines of up to $500.00, and incarceration for up to six months for repeat offenders.

Consolidated here are three civil suits, filed shortly after the enactment of the ordinance, by several residents of Morton Grove.[1] The plaintiffs have alleged that the enforcement of the ordinance, which has been stayed pending this court's ruling on its validity, would violate both the Illinois and United States constitutions. Both sides have moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the ordinance, on its face, violates article 1, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution, or the Second, Fifth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Because the state constitutional issue is potentially dispositive, the court will first address the validity of Ordinance #81-11 under the Illinois Constitution.

The Right to Arms Under the Illinois Constitution

In 1970, a right to arms clause was included in the Illinois Constitution for the first time. Article 1, section 22 provides:

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[1] The four named plaintiffs, Victor D. Quilici, Robert Stengl, George L. Reichert, and Robert E. Metler, all allege that they own handguns as defined in the ordinance and would be adversely affected if the ordinance were upheld.

Right to Arms

> Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

The plaintiffs have contended that Morton Grove's ordinance impermissibly infringes upon that right, while the defendant claims that its action represents a valid exercise of the police power. Central to the court's resolution of this controversy is a determination of the meaning of section 22, itself.

Section 22, on its face, requires a reconciliation of two competing notions of individual right and legislative prerogative. On one hand, it clearly recognizes the constitutional right of the individual "to keep and bear arms," and provides that the right "shall not be infringed." Yet, at the same time, the section expressly sanctions "constitutional infringements" of the right pursuant to the "police power," which is generally understood to mean the power of state and local governments to regulate *and even prohibit* conduct which is perceived to be inimical to the safety, health and welfare of society. *People* v. *Warren*, 11 Ill.2d 420, 424-25 (1957). *Accord, Drysdale* v. *Prudden*, 195 N.C. 722, 143 S.E. 530, 536 (1928); *Liquor Control Commission* v. *City of Calumet City*, 28 Ill.App.3d 279, 283 (1st Dist. 1975).

The plaintiffs have advocated a broad and liberal interpretation of the individual right to keep and bear arms, and a restrictive view of the scope of the police power. That power, they insist, must not be interpreted in a manner which would allow it to circumscribe the individual right contained in section 22. The defendant disagrees. Morton Grove argues that since the individual right in section 22 is made expressly subject to the broad power of the legislature, that right should be construed narrowly, and the police power should be interpreted according to its

usual and customary meaning, free from artificially-imposed restrictions. Because the language contained in section 22 itself offers no clue as to the proper reconciliation of these two competing concepts, the court finds it necessary to examine the provision's constitutional history, the source traditionally relied upon for the clarification of ambiguous constitutional provisions. *See Cosentino* v. *County of Adams*, 82 Ill.2d 565, 413 N.E.2d 870 (1980); *Client Follow-Up Co.* v. *Hynes*, 75 Ill.2d 208, 390 N.E.2d 847 (1979); *Wolfson* v. *Avery*, 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.W.2d 701 (1955); *Davis* v. *Attic Club*, 56 Ill.App.3d 58, 371 N.E.2d 903 (1st Dist. 1977).

While it is true that there are several sources upon which one might draw in reviewing the constitutional history of a provision, "the practice of consulting the debates of the members of the convention . . . has long been indulged in by courts as aiding to a true understanding of the meaning of provisions that are thought to be doubtful." *Burke* v. *Snively*, 208 Ill. 328, 344-45 (1904), quoted with approval in *Coalition for Political Honesty* v. *State Board of Elections*, 65 Ill.2d 453, 467 (1976); *Wolfson* v. *Avery*, 6 Ill.2d at 88; *Davis* v. *Attic Club*, 56 Ill.App.3d at 67-70. In this case, the court has found the delegates' debate on section 22 helpful to a meaningful reconciliation of the individual's right to arms and the state's broad police powers.

Prior to the delegates' floor debate on section 22, the Bill of Rights Committee voted twelve to three to include the following right to arms provision in the new constitution:

> Subject only to the police power of the State, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

Vol. 6, *Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention* [hereinafter "*Proceedings*"] 84.[2] Leonard Foster, the spokesman for the majority of the committee, was responsible for explaining the provision to the delegates. Although his explanation necessitated a narrow construction of the individual's right to arms, Foster suggested a resolution of the apparent tension between the section's terms. According to Foster, section 22 stood only for the limited right of the individual citizen to keep and bear "some form" of firearms; and as long as the government, in the exercise of its police power, did not totally prohibit the possession of *all* firearms, the right provided for in section 22 was not violated. 3 *Proceedings* at 1687, 1689, 1718 (remarks of delegate Foster).

Although the right to arms described by delegate Foster might have appeared on its face to be evanescent, Foster told the convention that under the 1870 Illinois Constitution, which contained no right to arms provision at all, a total prohibition of firearms was possible, and that the proposed section was designed to do no more than eliminate that possibility:

> It could be argued that, in theory, the legislature now has the right to ban all firearms in the state as far as individual citizens owning them is concerned. That is the power which we wanted to restrict—an absolute ban on all firearms. Nothing further.

3 *Proceedings* of 1688. Later in the debate, Foster emphasized just how limited the proposed right to arms would be:

> [S]hort of an absolute and complete ban on the possession of all firearms, this provision would leave the leg-

* * *

[2] In order to avoid any possible question as to whether the police power could be exercised by local governments, the delegates ultimately amended the proposed provision to delete the words "of the State" from the clause "Subject only to the police power." No challenge has been raised in this case regarding Morton Grove's ability as a local government to exercise that power.

> islature free to regulate the use of firearms in Illinois. It is the position of the majority that under the police power of the state, the legislature would have the authority, for example, to forbid all handguns.

3 *Proceedings* of 1718 (order inverted). Foster characterized the committee as "very reluctant" to include any right to arms provision at all in the new constitution, 3 *Proceedings* at 1687, and indicated clearly in his remarks that once the committee finally decided to include such a provision, that provision was intended to be construed narrowly, and fully subject to the broad police power.

During the debate, several of the delegates questioned Foster specifically with respect to the meaning of the term "police power" in the context of section 22, and any limitations which section 22 might impose upon the legislature. Foster was unequivocal: Section 22 would restrain no exercise of the legislature's power short of an absolute ban on all firearms. That statement prompted the following exchange:

> MR. FAY: Well, is that the extent of it?
>
> MR. FOSTER: This is the extent of it, Mr. Fay.
>
> * * *
>
> MRS. LEAHY: For a while, I had thought that perhaps the proposal might be a nullity—that you granted the right, but it could be taken away under the police power. According to your answer to the question asked by Mr. Fay, there is one exception to that police power [being] exercised, and that would be the total taking away?
>
> MR. FOSTER: Right.
>
> * * *
>
> MRS. LEAHY: Well, then you have total abolition and total right; and somewhere in between there, there are gradations.
>
> MR. FOSTER: No, we don't have total abolition versus total right. We have total abolition versus limited right—right limited by the police power extending up to but not including total abolition.

> MRS. LEAHY: Anything short of total abolition [that] is justified as reasonable for the safety, then, would be approved under your proposal?
>
> MR. FOSTER: Yes, in the opinion of the majority.

3 *Proceedings* at 1688. Clearly, section 22 was presented to the delegates as recognizing a narrow individual right which was subject to substantial legislative control.

From a review of the remarks of the delegates which followed Foster's explanation, it is clear that whatever their individual feelings about the right to arms, there was very little disagreement about the effect of making that right subject to the police power. As the debate progressed, two principal views emerged with respect to the meaning of the right to arms provision in section 22. One group of delegates supported the section, and seemed to adopt the view of the majority of the committee that section 22 represented only a narrow right, and limited virtually no exercise of the police power short of a total ban on all firearms. Typical of this group was delegate Durr:

> [H]and guns are by far and away the problem in this country and in this state, where there is a problem with firearms or arms of any kind. This document [Section 22] does not in any way attempt or intend, as I read it and as I suspect the courts would read it—and I've done some research on this—would not restrict the state or the county or the city or any other government within the confines of a reasonable—that is the key word, reasonable—control over hand guns. And I submit to you that that would include the prohibition, if they reasonably determined that hand guns were an undue hazard.

3 *Proceedings* at 1717-18. See also 3 *Proceedings* at 1709 (remarks of delegate Elward: "the plain language of the majority proposal . . . denies almost nothing that the General Assembly or any city council could do in the future.").

A second group of delegates saw little distinction between a limited right to keep "some form" of arms, and no right to arms at all. While in apparent agreement with the committee view that section 22 provided very little protection of an individual's rights in the face of a proper exercise of the police power, this group criticized the majority provision as being totally illusory. *E.g.*, 3 *Proceedings* at 1697 (remarks of delegate Weisberg). Some of those delegates favored no right to arms provision at all, and voted for the minority proposal to exclude any right to arms provision from the constitution. *E.g.*, 3 *Proceedings* at 1713 (remarks of delegate Tomei), 1720 (remarks of delegate Thompson). Others supported a strong constitutional right to arms, and eventually voted for the majority proposal, but only after making it clear to the convention that they felt it too weak. *See* 3 *Proceedings* at 1708 (remarks of delegate Friedrich: "Frankly, I don't think what we're putting in . . . is strong enough. . . . [M]any of [the states'] constitutional provisions are much more enabling than the one that's proposed here."); 1704 (remarks of Father Lawlor, proposing, *inter alia*, the removal of the term "police power" from the provision). Most of those delegates acknowledged that the inclusion of the term "police power" substantially undercut the right to arms. To the extent that one looks to the convention debate for assistance in reconciling the conflict between the right to arms and the exercise of the police power, the debate clearly supports a narrow construction of the individual right.

The plaintiffs, in urging the court to reject a narrow construction of the right to arms, have sharply criticized any significant reliance on the constitutional debates. First, they argue that emphasis on the debates is misplaced because the true inquiry in resolving constitutional ambigui-

ties is to determine "the understanding . . . by the voters who, by their vote, have given life to the product of the convention." *Consentino* v. *County of Adams*, 82 Ill. 2d at 569. *See also Client Follow-Up Co.* v. *Hynes*, 75 Ill.2d at 222; *Wolfson* v. *Avery*, 6 Ill.2d at 88. *But see Winokur* v. *Rosewell*, 83 Ill.2d 92, 100-102 (1980) (relying on framers' intent to clarify ambiguous constitutional provision).[3] To determine the voters' understanding, the plaintiffs have requested the court to consider such additional sources as: (1) The Official Explanation of section 22 which was provided to the voters prior to ratification of the constitution; (2) Newspaper articles written at around the time of the ratification vote discussing the right to arms provisions; and (3) The "plain meaning" which ordinary voters might have attributed to the term "police power." None of those sources, however, meaningfully addresses the reconciliation of individual right and legislative power which section 22 requires.

The "Official Text of the Proposed 1970 Illinois Constitution with Explanation" provides:

> Section 22 *Right to Arms*
>
> Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

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[3] It must be emphasized that the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs do not support outright rejection of the delegates' debate as a source of information, but only suggest the consideration of alternative sources as an aid to resolving constitutional ambiguities. *See Client Follow-Up Co.* v. *Hynes*, 75 Ill.2d at 220: "When the meaning of provisions of the constitution are in doubt, it is appropriate to consult the debates of the delegates to the constitutional convention to ascertain the meaning which they intended to give those provisions." *See also, Wolfson* v. *Avery*, 6 Ill.2d at 88.

Explanation

This new section states that the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed, except as the exercise of this right may be regulated by appropriate laws to safeguard the welfare of the community.

Even taking the "Official Explanation" into consideration, the court is unconvinced of the plaintiffs' position. Far from reconciling the tension between the exercise of the individual right and the exercise of the police power, the above explanation begs the question. Like the text of the section itself, the explanation offers no clue as to the limits on the police power. *See Davis* v. *Attic Club*, 56 Ill.App.3d at 67 (rejecting reliance on the "Official Explanation of the 1970 Proposed Constitution" as being too conclusory and superficial).

Similarly, the court can find no meaningful reconciliation of the two concepts in the Chicago Tribune article of December 13, 1970, which referred to the new right only sketchily as a "new right . . . to keep and bear arms," and summarized section 22 as providing "a guarantee of the individual's right to own firearms." No attention at all is devoted to the critical issue of interpretation as to the limit on the police power.

Finally, the suggestion that the right to arms warrants a liberal reading because that is how "the people" would read it must be rejected. According to this argument, the voters did not understand the full import of the term "police power" when they ratified the constitution. Instead, they most likely thought that they were ratifying a broad right to arms, one which would not tolerate a total handgun ban. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue that the court should give effect to the public's perception of the right rather than its actual meaning. The court cannot agree. Section 22 says explicitly that the individual right is sub-

ject to the police power. The Illinois Supreme Court has defined that term to include the power "to prohibit." *People* v. *Warren*, 11 Ill.2d at 424-25. Sound principles of construction require that "in those instances in which [the Illinois Supreme Court], prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1970, has defined a term found therein, that it be given the same definition, unless it is clearly apparent that some other meaning was intended." *Bridgewater* v. *Hotz*, 51 Ill.2d 103, 109 (1972). The plaintiff's arguments to the contrary are incorrect.

The plaintiffs' final attack on the debates concerns the conflict between certain language in the Bill of Rights Committee majority report on section 22 and the position taken by the committee on the floor of the convention. The plaintiffs refer the court to the following language in the report:

> The substance of the right [contained in Section 22] is that a citizen has the right to possess and make reasonable use of arms that law-abiding persons commonly employ for purposes of recreation or the protection of person and property. Laws that attempted to ban all possession or use of such arms, or laws that subjected possession or use of such arms to regulations or taxes so onerous that all possession or use was effectively banned, would be invalid."

6 *Proceedings* at 87, *citing People* v. *Brown*, 253 Mich. 537, 541-42, 235 N.W. 245, 246-47 (1931); *State* v. *Duke*, 42 Tex. 455, 458 (1875); *In re Brickey*, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902); *People* v. *Zerillo*, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927 (1922); *State* v. *Kerner*, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921). The plaintiffs argue first that those cases, decided under other states' constitutions, support their conclusion that the police power should be read restrictively. Second, they argue that the mere fact that those cases were included in the committee report serves as an indication of the dele-

gates' intent that the police power should be narrowly construed, contrary to the intent expressed on the convention floor. The court rejects both of these arguments.

While the language used in some of these cases supports the text used in the report, the cases themselves were decided under distinctly different constitutional provisions. *In re Brickley*, for example, was decided 80 years ago, under a state constitutional provision which stated:

> The people have the right to bear arms for security and defense, but the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law.

70 P. at 609. In its opinion in *Brickey*, the Supreme Court of Idaho held only that the inclusion of the term "regulate" in the Idaho Constitution did not permit the legislature to prohibit persons from carrying firearms. *Id.* The framers of the Illinois Constitution did not choose to use the term "regulate" to limit the Illinois right to arms. Instead, they used the expression "subject to the police power," which the Illinois Supreme Court had already held to include the power to prohibit. *See People* v. *Warren*, *supra*. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court had already stated that the police power specifically included the power to prohibit firearms. *Biffer* v. *City of Chicago*, 278 Ill. 562 (1917). By including an express police power limitation, the Illinois right to arms provision is simply different from those of the other states.

A further distinction between section 22 and the other provisions is that the Illinois right to arms provision has a clear constitutional history which supports a narrow reading of the right to arms. No such constitutional history is mentioned in the two-paragraph *Brickey* opinion, or in the other cases cited by the plaintiffs, *E.g.*, *State* v. *Kerner*, *supra*. For these reasons, the court finds the cases decided under other states' constitutional provisions unpersuasive in this case.

Although the cases decided under other states' constitutions were mentioned in the committee report, little can be concluded merely from the fact of their mention in the report. For, on the very page following its citation of *In re Brickey*, the report quoted with approval the following language from the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in *Biffer* v. *City of Chicago*:

> It is clear, under the authorities, that the sale of deadly weapons may be absolutely prohibited under the police power of the State, and to do this in no way conflicts with the provision of the constitution of the United States and of various state constitutions that "the people have a right to bear arms for their defense and security."

278 Ill. at 570. 6 *Proceedings* at 88. The majority report then added:

> Because arms pose an extraordinary threat to the safety and good order of society, the possession and use of arms is subject to an extraordinary degree of control under the police power.

6 *Proceedings* at 88. Contrary to the plaintiffs' arguments, the views contained in the committee report are certainly consistent with the narrow reading of the right to arms expressed so clearly by the delegates on the floor of the convention.[4] Nothing in the committee report persuades the court to disregard the clear expression of the delegates' intent contained in the debates.

After carefully reviewing the constitutional history of section 22, including the actual language used in the provi-

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[4] Similarly, the report's failure to list a handgun ban among its illustrations of such applications of the police power is not necessarily inconsistent with the committee's view during the debate. The report explicitly indicated that its list of illustrations was intended to be nonexhaustive.

sion, the text of the convention debates, the committee report, and the other sources discussed above, the court concludes that the right to arms in Illinois is so limited by the police power that a ban on handguns does not violate that right. On at least five occasions, the convention debates indicated that such a ban would not be unconstitutional, 3 *Proceedings* at 1687, 1689, 1693, 1718, and the court agrees with that assessment. Furthermore, the court concludes that as long as a law does not totally ban all firearms, it must only qualify as a valid exercise of the police power in order to survive constitutional challenge under section 22. Therefore, the narrow question remaining for the court is whether Morton Grove's enactment was a proper exercise of the police power.

By banning the possession of handguns by private citizens within its borders, Morton Grove has gone further than either the state legislature or any other municipality in gun regulation, either before or after the inclusion of a right to arms in the Illinois Constitution. Therefore, it is necessary to give extremely careful consideration to the permissible limits of the police power as applied to the sweeping provisions of this ordinance.

Despite the fact that no other court has been called upon to consider a handgun ordinance of this scope, this court, when considering the police power of the state or municipality, is not writing on a blank slate. The Illinois Supreme Court has recently considered and restated the guiding principles by which this court must be led in its review of an enactment under the police power. *See City of Carbondale v. Brewster*, 78 Ill.2d 111 (1979), *appeal dismissed*, 446 U.S. 931 (1980). The *Carbondale* court stated the following:

> The police power may be exercised to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare or convenience. . . . To be a valid exercise of police power, the legislation must bear a reasonable relationship to one of the foregoing interests which is sought to be protected, and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such objective. . . . Although the determination of reasonableness is a matter for the court, the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure such interest. . . . The court will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expediency. *Id.* at 114-15 (citations omitted).

See also People v. *Haron*, 85 Ill.2d 261, 279-80 (1981) ("[T]he standard of a proper exercise of the police power is whether the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare." (citation omitted)).

Certainly, there can be no question that the Morton Grove ordinance is oriented to those interests which are proper aims of any exercise of the state's police power. The preamble to the ordinance demonstrates that the public health and safety were uppermost in the minds of the Trustees of Morton Grove. The preamble states:

> WHEREAS, it has been determined that in order to promote and protect the health and safety and welfare of the public it is necessary to regulate the possession of firearms and other dangerous weapons, and
>
> WHEREAS, the Corporate Authorities of the Village of Morton Grove have found and determined that the easy and convenient availability of certain types of firearms and weapons have increased the potentiality of firearms related deaths and injuries, and

> WHEREAS, handguns play a major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery, and accidental injury and death.

The public health and safety are proper police power objectives. Illinois courts have consistently held firearms controls to be within the purview of the police power. *See Brown* v. *City of Chicago*, 42 Ill.2d 501 (1969) (declaring Chicago firearms registration ordinance valid); *Biffer* v. *City of Chicago*, *supra* (declaring Chicago ordinance restricting sale of concealable weapons valid); *Rawlings* v. *Department of Law Enforcement*, 73 Ill.App.3d 267 (3d Dist. 1979) (declaring Illinois statute prohibiting, *inter alia*, former mental patients from obtaining gun licenses to be a valid exercise of the police power); *People* v. *Williams*, 60 Ill.App.3d 726 (1st Dist. 1978) (declaring Illinois concealed weapons statute valid). Here, too, the court concludes that Morton Grove's firearms ordinance is properly related to the public health and safety.

The above finding that the interests sought to be protected by the Trustees of Morton Grove may properly be the targets of an exercise of the police power does not end this court's inquiry. The question remains whether the Morton Grove ordinance, which effectively bans the possession of any handguns, is a reasonable method of promoting the interests of public health and safety.

The plaintiffs suggest in the strongest possible terms that this requirement for a proper exercise of the police power has not been met here. They argue that the ordinance does not reflect a reasonable response to the problems of weapons misuse, but rather is an arbitrary and simplistic response, resulting in an unreasonable and capricious exercise of the police power.

Morton Grove defends its ordinance as a reasonable legislative response to the very serious problem of handguns in our society, and disputes the characterization of its

ordinance as a total prohibition of firearms, or even handguns. By its terms, the ordinance (1) excludes "long guns" such as shot guns and rifles from its proscriptions; (2) exempts certain individuals, such as peace officers, members of the armed forces, and licensed gun collectors, from many of the ordinance's restrictions; and (3) allows the continued recreational use of handguns under certain conditions, at licensed gun clubs. The inclusion of those exceptions, the Village argues, indicates that the Trustees attempted to construct an ordinance broad enough to effectuate its objective of protecting public safety without unnecessarily restricting the possession and use of firearms.

In reviewing the reasonableness of Morton Grove's ordinance, it is necessary to recognize certain important limitations on the court's review function. First, it is not the role of the court to test the factual validity of the findings which support an exercise of the police power. That is a uniquely legislative responsibility. The Illinois Supreme Court made this very clear when it ruled on the validity of Chicago's gun registration ordinance in 1969:

> Plaintiffs argue at length that strict gun laws do not tend to reduce crime, and statistics and excerpts from reports of surveys are quoted to show that legal restrictions are easily circumvented by experienced criminals. . . . These arguments, whatever validity they might have, are not appropriately addressed to this court. They relate to matters of legislative instead of judicial concern, and bear on the advisability of the present provisions rather than on their validity."

Brown v. *City of Chicago*, 42 Ill.2d at 507. This court is not free, in reviewing Morton Grove's ordinance, to re-examine and reweigh the evidence upon which the legislative decision was premised.

In addition, the court is not to decide whether the means selected by the legislature are the best way to deal with the perceived problem, or whether other alternatives available would have been better. As quoted above, "The court will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of opinion as to its wisdom, necessity, and expediency." *City of Carbondale*, 78 Ill.2d at 115. *See Memorial Gardens Assoc.* v. *Smith*, 16 Ill.2d 116, *appeal dismissed*, 361 U.S. 31 (1959); *State Dental Society* v. *Sutker*, 76 Ill.App.3d 240 (1st Dist. 1979), *cert. denied*, 447 U.S. 930 (1980).

The appropriate test is one of arbitrariness. *City of Carbondale*, 78 Ill.2d at 115. A prediction that the present ordinance may not be a panacea for all of the problems arising from the possession and use of handguns would not prove the plaintiffs' contention that this ordinance is arbitrary and simplistic. If the present ordinance was adopted on the expectation of the Trustees that it would serve to inch the Morton Grove community one step further to becoming peaceable and safe, this would justify the use of the police power. Many social experiments have only small beginnings.

The issue of whether or not private citizens should be allowed to possess handguns freely, whether for their own defense or for other purposes, has constantly been in the political arena. Plaintiffs themselves have presented substantial material to this court showing that the question was controversial in England as early as the 1600's. Certainly it was a very important issue in the debates of the Illinois Constitutional Convention, as is shown by the preceding review of those debates. The Trustees of the Village of Morton Grove could not have been unaware of the existence of the handgun debate.

In addition, the Morton Grove Trustees were entitled to take notice of a recent Illinois case in which the instant provision of the Illinois Constitution was discussed. *People* v. *Williams, supra*, involved a prosecution under the Illinois Criminal Code for knowing possession within a city of "any loaded pistol, revolver or other firearm." 60 Ill.App.3d at 727. An exception in that statute allowed possession by an individual in his own home or place of business. The defendant in that case had in his possession a .32-caliber pistol loaded with four rounds of live ammunition and one spent round. The Illinois Appellate Court had no difficulty in finding that the Criminal Code provision was a reasonable exercise of the police power, because the state had a valid interest in controlling crime within its borders. *See also, Rawlings* v. *Department of Law Enforcement, supra.*

In addition to controlling crime, the Trustees also stated in the preamble that they were attempting to reduce the incidence of handgun related accidents. The Trustees needed only to read the daily papers to have been aware of the large number of tragic accidents involving the use or misuse of handguns in the home. Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that there is some support for the link between accidental injuries and handguns, specifically. As one commentator observed:

> The handgun—long gun distinction is founded both in the existence of legitimate recreational uses of long guns and on perceived empirical evidence that long guns are not misused nearly as frequently as handguns."

Comment, *The Impact of State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation*, 38 U.Chi.Rev. 185, 207 (1970). Certainly, the Village has a valid interest in attempting to reduce the possibility of firearms catastrophes in Morton Grove. A ban on the possession of handguns in the home cannot be considered

an unreasonable response to that problem, and may in fact be the only method of attaining the goal sought by the Trustees.

In addition to claiming that Morton Grove's exercise of its police power is "arbitrary and simplistic," plaintiffs also argue that the ordinance is invalid because it is a prohibition of the possession of handguns, rather than a regulation of their use. Plaintiffs rely on *In re Brickey, supra,* and *Andrews* v. *State,* 50 Tenn. 165 (1871), to suggest that the police power does not include the power to prohibit.

That argument by the plaintiffs misstates current Illinois law. As stated above, the police power does include the power to prohibit. "In the exercise of its inherent police power, the legislature may enact laws regulating, restraining *or prohibiting* anything harmful to the welfare of the people, even though such regulation, restraint *or prohibition* interferes with the liberty or property of an individual. *People* v. *Warren,* 11 Ill.2d at 424-25 (emphasis added). *See Biffer* v. *City of Chicago, supra; Liquor Control Commission* v. *City of Calumet City, supra.*

Given that the Morton Grove ordinance is a reasonable response to the problems seen by the Trustees, it is not automatically invalid because it is a prohibition rather than a regulation.

In sum, this court concludes that the Morton Grove ordinance has as its basis the proper goals of protecting the safety and health of the people. In addition, the court finds that the ordinance does not represent a complete ban on firearms, and is reasonable and neither arbitrary nor simplistic. The ordinance was both properly and validly enacted under Morton Grove's police power. Therefore, the court concludes that ordinance #81-11 does not violate any of the plaintiffs' rights under the Illinois Constitution.

United States Constitutional Issues

In addition to their claims under the Illinois State Constitution, the plaintiffs also argue that the Morton Grove ordinance violates the United States Constitution, specifically the Second, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.

A. *Second and Fourteenth Amendments*

The Second Amendment provides as follows:

> A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

The plaintiffs rely substantially on historical arguments to buttress their contention that the Morton Grove ordinance infringes upon that Amendment. They review (1) the common law background of the right of individuals to possess weapons; (2) the impetus for the Second Amendment, which was the constitutional framers' fear that a national standing army would be inimical to personal rights and liberties; and (3) pre-Civil War judicial decisions in which the individual's right to bear arms was considered. Based on those materials, plaintiffs conclude that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms, including handguns, as opposed to a collective right in the states to maintain a militia separate from the federal standing army. After reaching that conclusion, plaintiffs then review the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and suggest that its framers intended that the Second Amendment should apply to the actions of the states.

Defendant Morton Grove's main response to plaintiffs' arguments is extremely simple. The Village points to the Supreme Court's decision in *Presser* v. *Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), in which the Court held that the prohibitions

of the Second Amendment limited only the power of the United States Congress, and not the power of the individual states. Since this court is bound by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the Village argues that plaintiffs' contentions are largely irrelevant. In the alternative, Morton Grove also controverts the specific arguments made by the plaintiffs. The defendant claims that the Second Amendment does not create an individual right, but merely prohibits legislation that would impair the states' right to have a militia. *See, United States* v. *Miller*, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Also, the Village specifically refutes each of the plaintiffs' arguments, contending that they are not supported by common law traditions, the history of the Second Amendment, early state court decisions, or the statements of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. While some of those arguments are persuasive, there is no purpose in considering them further in view of the controlling *Presser* decision.

At issue in *Presser* was an Illinois statute which forbade private organizations from parading with arms in any city or town of the state, without a license from the Governor. Presser was convicted and fined for violating the statute. On Appeal to the Supreme Court, Presser claimed that the Illinois provision infringed his Second Amendment right. The Court rejected that argument, stating as follows:

> [A] conclusive answer to the contention that this amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon that of the States. It was so held by this court in the case of *United States* v. *Cruikshank*, 92 U.S. 542, 553, in which the Chief Justice, in delivering the judgment of the court, said, that the right of the people to keep and bear arms

> "is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed, but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the National government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes to what is called in *The City of New York* v. *Miln*, 11 Pet. [102] 139, the 'powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was perhaps more properly called internal police,' 'not surrendered or restrained' by the Constitution of the United States."

Id. at 265. The obvious holding of *Presser* is that the Second Amendment was not incorporated into the Fourteenth, and that it does not serve as a check on the power of the state legislature or municipal councils in Illinois.

The Supreme Court has never reconsidered its holding in *Presser*. Consequently, that opinion stands as the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the issue of whether the Second Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment so as to limit the power of the states. It is a truism that the district court is bound by the holdings of the Supreme Court to the extent that they bear on questions before the district court. *Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.* v. *NLRB*, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), *rev'd on other grounds*, 50 U.S.L.W. 4037 (1981). That rule applies irrespective of the age of the Supreme Court opinion, the district judge's personal opinion of the validity of the Supreme Court's action, or whether he believes the Supreme Court would rule as it did if the issue were again before it. *United States* v. *Chase*, 281 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1960); *Sullivan*

Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 420 F.Supp. 815 (N.D.Ill. 1976).

Plaintiffs make two principal arguments in urging that this court not follow the holding in *Presser*.[5] They argue first that *Presser*, when read properly, actually supports, rather than contradicts, their contention that the ordinance is unconstitutional. Second, they claim that irrespective of how *Presser* is read, it is no longer good law; in effect saying that the later cases incorporating several of the first ten amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment overrule *Presser sub silentio*. Neither of those arguments is persuasive.

Plaintiffs seize upon the phrase in *Presser* that "the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms . . .," 116 U.S. at 265, to support their argument that defendant has misread that decision. When the phrase is read in context, however, it actually supports Morton Grove's position in this case, not the plaintiffs'.

The entire phrase referred to above, from which the plaintiffs have relied on but a portion, reads as follows:

> [T]he States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the

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[5] Plaintiffs' other arguments, urging this court to find that the ordinance infringes the Second Amendment, include claims based on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, the general change in the viewpoint of the Supreme Court concerning the issue of incorporation, and early state cases addressing the individual's right to bear arms. Those arguments would require the court, if it accepted them, to reach a decision contrary to the holding in *Presser*. Since this court has no power or authority to do that, the arguments are irrelevant here.

> United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government.

Id. Plaintiffs here have not suggested that the Morton Grove ordinance in any way interferes with the ability of the United States to maintain public security, nor could they make an argument to that effect. Irrespective of the Constitutional framers' fear of a national standing army, the United States currently has one and relies upon it, not upon armed private citizens, to maintain public security.

In relying upon the above quoted phrase, plaintiffs also overlook the immediately previous sentence in *Presser*, in which the Supreme Court cites *Mayor of New York v. Miln*, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). At the place cited to in *Presser*, the Court in *Miln* said the following:

> [A] state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends; where the power over the particular subject, or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restained, in the manner just stated. That all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called *internal police*, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unqualified and exclusive.

36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 139 (emphasis in original). Read in context, the phrase referred to by the plaintiffs was not meant to be a limitation on the authority of the states,

but merely stated the obvious position that, whenever required by the federal government or absent any regulation whatsoever, an individual has the right to keep and bear arms. Under certain circumstances, that right may be limited by the states through the valid exercise of what has come to be known as the "police power," without fear that any United States Constitution provisions will be infringed. As was discussed at length above in this court's review of the Illinois Constitution, the Morton Grove ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power. *Presser* requires no more than that.

Plaintiffs' second argument, that *Presser* has been overruled *sub silentio* by later decisions of the Supreme Court is equally unavailing. In their memorandum on this position, plaintiffs rely substantially on Justice Black's dissenting opinion in *Adamson* v. *California*, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Although three other Justices concurred with Justice Black that the Bill of Rights, in its entirety, should be incorporated into the protections offered by the Fourteenth Amendment, that position has never been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court. *See* L. Tribe, *American Constitutional Law* §11-2 (1978). That situation is underscored by the fact that some provisions of the Bill of Rights, in addition to the Second Amendment, have never been held to apply to the states. *See Watson* v. *Jago*, 558 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1977) (Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury); *Iacaponi* v. *New Amsterdam Casualty Co.*, 258 F.Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1966), *aff'd*, 379 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967), *cert. denied*, 389 U.S. 1054 (1968) (Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases).

The language in *Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), quoted by the plaintiffs, is not to the contrary. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected "the notion that the

Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights'." 378 U.S. at 10-11, (quoting from *Ohio ex rel. Eaton* v. *Price*, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). That statement was not intended by the Court to be a wholesale incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather to give content to a particular right that had already been incorporated. Justice Harlan's dissent in *Poe* v. *Ullman*, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), also fails to provide any support to plaintiffs here. While Justice Harlan did recognize that the right to keep and bear arms was protected by the Bill of Rights, he was careful to note that the Supreme Court has consistently resisted the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment was merely a shorthand reference to what was set out in the Bill of Rights. *Id.* at 541.

Presser directly bears on the issue of whether the states or their political subdivisions are limited by the Second Amendment, and it is still good law, notwithstanding plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary. *Presser* controls this court and, therefore, requires it to hold that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states and localities and so is not infringed by the Morton Grove ordinance. Numerous state and lower federal courts who have considered the issue agree with this conclusion. *See Cases* v. *United States*, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), *cert. denied*, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); *Eckert* v. *City of Philadelphia*, 329 F.Supp. 845 (E.D.Pa. 1971), *aff'd*, 447 F.2d 610 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 414 U.S. 843 (1973); *In re. Atkinson*, 291 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1980); *State* v. *Amos*, 343 So.2d 166 (La. 1977); *Commonwealth* v. *Davis*, 369 Mass. 886, 343 N.E.2d 847 (1976); *State* v. *Sanne*, 116 N.H. 583, 364 A.2d

630 (1976); *Harris* v. *State*, 83 Nev. 404, 432 P.2d 929 (1967); *State* v. *Swanton*, 129 Ariz. 131, 629 P.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1981).

B. *Ninth Amendment*

The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

> The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Plaintiffs' arguments under this provision center on a claimed right to self defense. They suggest that the right to bear arms for the purpose of self defense was recognized by several famous natural law philosophers, among them Aristotle, Cicero, and John Locke. Cicero, for instance, noted, "if our lives are endangered by plots or violence or armed robbers or enemies, any and every method of protecting ourselves is morally right." Cicero, *In Defense of Titus Annius Milo*, Selected Political Speeches 222 (M. Grant trans. 1969). In addition, plaintiffs point to several early court decisions under the English common law, which recognized the right of individuals to keep and use weapons for personal defense and defense of the home.

Although plaintiffs' arguments have an understandable facial appeal, the court is unable to accept the argument that this claimed right is protected by the Ninth Amendment.

Neither plaintiffs, the defendant, nor this court has discovered a single instance in which the Supreme Court has explicitly held that a particular right was protected by the Ninth Amendment. In the situations where the Court has given protection to individual rights not explicitly

listed in the first ten amendments, it has relied on "penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The only rights so recognized by the Court have involved the truly personal and private rights relating to questions of family and procreation. *See Moore* v. *City of East Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); *Roe* v. *Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); *Griswold*, *supra*. Never has the Court recognized anything like a right to self defense, or a right to carry handguns, based either on the penumbra theory or directly under the Ninth Amendment.

The only explicit discussion in any Supreme Court opinion of the Ninth Amendment and its reach appears in the concurrence by Justice Goldberg in *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 486-99. Justice Goldberg argued that there were certain fundamental rights, arising from the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people," *id.* at 493 (*quoting Snyder* v. *Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)), which required the protection of the Ninth Amendment. Whatever the appeal of such an analysis, Justice Goldberg's thesis has never been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court. The Ninth Amendment furnishes no support for the plaintiffs' fundamental right argument. The Morton Grove ordinance does not violate its provisions.

C. *Fifth Amendment*

Plaintiffs Quilici and Stengl both alleged in their complaints that the Morton Grove ordinance infringed the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the taking of private property for public use, "without just compensation." Plaintiffs appear to have abandoned that argument, by failing to discuss it in their memoranda of law filed with

this court. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, the court will address it briefly.

It is well established that a Fifth Amendment taking can occur through the exercise of the police power regulating property rights. In order for a regulatory taking to require compensation, however, the exercise of the police power must result in the destruction of the use and enjoyment of a legitimate private property right. *Kaiser Aetna* v. *United States*, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); *Devines* v. *Maier*, No. 80-2315 (7th Cir. November 23, 1981). The Morton Grove ordinance does not go that far. The geographic reach of the ordinance is limited; gun owners who wish to may sell or otherwise dispose of their handguns outside of Morton Grove. *See Fresjian* v. *Jefferson*, 399 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1979). If handgun owners do not wish to sell their weapons, they may simply register and store them at a licensed gun club. Finally, the ordinance has an exception for licensed collectors, for whom neither of those two alternatives may be acceptable.

D. *Vagueness*

In his memorandum, plaintiff Quilici implies that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. He suggests specifically that the ordinance's definition of "handgun" as "a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person" might apply to shotguns and rifles in an unpredictable manner.

The conditions under which vagueness challenges to a statute may be considered have been clearly set out by the Supreme Court. "It is well-established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand." *United States* v. *Mazurie*, 419 U.S.

544, 550 (1975). *See United States* v. *McCauley*, 601 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1979); *United States* v. *Howard*, 569 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 834 (1978). Plaintiff has failed to present an issue of the meaning of the statute as it applies to any weapon possessed by him. Rather, plaintiff, in his complaint, alleges that he owns handguns which are subject to the strictures of the ordinance. It is obvious that the ordinance gives Mr. Quilici "adequate warning" that his conduct would be illegal. *United States* v. *Powell*, 423 U.S. 87, 93 (1975).

Conclusion

Perhaps the clearest fact that emerges from this litigation is that the issue of gun control, in whatever form, is controversial. Reasonable people can, in good conscience, oppose what Morton Grove has done, while equally reasonable people can fully support this ordinance. Perhaps nowhere else is that situation more clearly demonstrated than in the lengthy and well thought out briefs filed by the opposing parties in this case.

After full consideration, the court has concluded that the Morton Grove ordinance was properly enacted pursuant to the police power, and that it does not infringe upon the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Although those legal questions decided by this court will reach finality at some point in time, the debate over the wisdom of this legislation will continue. Article 1, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution was drafted and presented to the voters of Illinois as a reflection of the conflicting views of the delegates. The voters of Illinois then approved the new Constitution with the express provision that the right to bear arms would be subject to the police power. The Trustees of Morton Grove, also acting in an atmosphere of public debate and conflict, have made a

legislative decision that the danger posed by the easy availability of handguns is serious enough to warrant the banning of all handguns within this particular community. Before taking this action, the Morton Grove Trustees must have been aware of the deep-seated conviction of a number of its citizens that they should be permitted to retain handguns for the protection of person and property. The Trustees concluded, however, that the public interest outweighed the claimed personal interests of the opponents of this legislation. The ultimate settlement of this troublesome political question must be returned to the citizens of Morton Grove where it properly belongs rather than in the courts.

For all the reasons stated above, the court finds that the Morton Grove ordinance is valid. It does not infringe any of the provisions of either the Illinois State Constitution or the United States Constitution. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and plaintiffs' motions are denied. The stay precluding enforcement of the ordinance is hereby lifted.

ENTER:

.....

/s/ *Bernard M. Decker*
United States District Judge

DATED: December 29, 1981.

APPENDIX C

Opinion by Judge Bauer

Judge Coffey dissenting

JUDGMENT — ORAL ARGUMENT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

December 6, 1982.

Before

Hon. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge
Hon. Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge
Hon. John L. Coffey, Circuit Judge

VICTOR D. QUILICI, ROBERT STENGL, et al.,
GEORGE L. REICHERT, and ROBERT E. METLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Nos. 82-1045, vs.

81-1076 and 82-1132

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
Nos. 81 C 3432, 81 C 4086, and 81 C 5071
Bernard M. Decker, Judge

This cause was heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this case appealed from be, and the same is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs, in accordance with the opinion of this Court filed this date.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

December 10, 1982

Before

Hon. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge
Hon. Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge
Hon. John L. Coffey, Circuit Judge

VICTOR D. QUILICI, ROBERT STENGL, et al,
GEORGE L. REICHERT and ROBERT METLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Nos. 82-1045, 82-1076 & 82-1132 vs.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 81 C 3432, 81 C 4086 & 81 C 5071
Bernard Decker, *Judge*.

O R D E R

IT IS ORDERED, *sua sponte*, that the opinion entered December 6, 1982 in the above appeal be amended as follows:

Page 35, line 8, the word "light" should be changed to read "right."

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

March 2, 1983

Before

Hon. Walter J. Cummings, Chief Judge
Hon. Wilbur F. Pell, Jr., Circuit Judge
Hon. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge
Hon. Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judge
Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit Judge
Hon. Jesse Eschbach, Circuit Judge
Hon. Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge
Hon. John L. Coffey, Circuit Judge

VICTOR D. QUILICI, ROBERT STENGL, et al,
GEORGE L. REICHERT and ROBERT E. METLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Nos. 82-1045, 82-1076 and 82-1132 vs.

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Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 81 C 3432, 81 C 4086 & 81 C 5071
Bernard M. Decker, *Judge*.

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *en banc* filed in the above-entitled cause by the Plaintiffs-Appellants, Victor D. Quilici, Robert Stengl, George L. Reichert and Robert E. Metler, a vote of the active members of the Court was requested, and a majority* of the active members of the Court have voted to deny a rehearing *en banc*. A majority** of the judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petition for rehearing. Accordingly,

It is ordered that the aforesaid petition for rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

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* The Hon. Jesse Eschbach and the Hon. John L. Coffey both voted to grant a rehearing *en banc*.

** The Hon. John L. Coffey voted to grant a rehearing.

APPENDIX F

Partial list of extended media coverage of the Village of Morton Grove's Ordinance 81-11 and this litigation.

Television

ABC, 6 O'CLOCK NEWS—10 June 1981

CBS, SUNDAY MORNING NEWS—12 June 1981

ABC, GOOD MORNING AMERICA—15-19 June 1981; 6 January 1982

ABC, EVENING NEWS—28 December, 1981

ABC, *NBC*, *CBS*, EVENING NEWS—29 December 1981

ABC, PHIL DONAHUE SHOW—8 April 1982

ABC, *NBC*, *CBS*, EVENING NEWS—6 December 1982

PBS, MACNEIL/LEHER REPORT—18-22 January 1983

Newspapers

UPI, news release, 12 June 1981, "Ill. Town Bans Handgun Sale, Possession."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, editorial, 13 June 1981, (p. 16) "The Right to Ban Arms."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, news item, 26 July 1981, (p. 15) "Outlawing Pistols."

LOS ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL, cover story, 7 September 1981, (p. A 14) "First in the Nation, Village's Gun Laws Pave Way for Test of Firearms Rights."

THE WASHINGTON POST, feature story, 8 November 1981, (p. A1) "Suburb Waging Impassioned War on Guns" and "Town's Citizen-Lawmakers Enact Gun Ban."

LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER, editorial, 30 December, 1981, "The Gun to our Heads."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, editorial, 14 January 1982, "The Guns of Morton Grove."

WALLSTREET JOURNAL, feature story, 20 January 1982, (Sec. 1, p. 1) "In Morton Grove, Ill., They're Up In Arms Over Handgun Ban."

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, feature story, 28 January 1982, (p. 10) "Gun Control Proponents Face Battle In Congress."

DETROIT FREE PRESS, feature story, 8 February 1982, (p. A1) "Gun Ban Splits Morton Grove."

THE SPECTATOR, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, cover story, 9 April 1982, "Gun Fight . . . The City That Said No . . . The City That Said Yes."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE, feature story, 25 April 1982, (Sec. 2, p. 2) "Tale of Three Cities: The Politics of Handguns."

Magazines

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, feature story, 31 May 1982, "Battle Over Gun Control Heats Up Across U.S."

NEWSWEEK, feature story, 15 March 1982, "A New Push For Gun Control."

PEOPLE, feature story, 5 April 1982, "When The South Rises Again . . ."

LIFE, cover story, April 1982, "Taking Aim at Guns, a Tale of Two Cities."

APPENDIX G

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

VICTOR D. QUILICI,

Plaintiff,

v.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,

Defendant.

ROBERT STENGL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, et al.,

Defendants.

GEORGE L. REICHERT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,

Defendant.

Nos. 81 C 3432, 81 C 4086, 81 C 5071 (Consolidated)
Hon. Bernard M. Decker

JUDGMENT ORDER

These consolidated cases were before the Court on plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. The motions have been fully briefed by the parties, and the Court has carefully reviewed and considered all arguments set forth in them. The Court being in all respects fully advised and informed,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

2. Each of plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment is denied.

3. Judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs on each and every claim of plaintiffs' complaints.

ENTER:

Bernard M. Decker
United States District Judge

Dated: Dec 29 1981

Nos. 82-1822, 82-1930, & 82-1934

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1982

VICTOR D. QUILICI, *Petitioner,*

vs.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, *Respondent.*

ROBERT STENGL, et al., *Petitioners,*

vs.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, et al., *Respondents.*

GEORGE L. REICHERT, et al., *Petitioners,*

vs.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, *Respondent.*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS P. SULLIVAN*
MICHAEL H. SALSBURY
EUGENE R. WEDOFF
JENNER & BLOCK
21 DuPont Circle, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-5470

MARTIN C. ASHMAN
134 North LaSalle Street
Room 1316
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 782-3484

Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

CHAS. P. YOUNG CHICAGO, INC.

Questions Presented for Review

1. Whether the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution should be construed, contrary to settled decisions of this Court, to prohibit a municipality from restricting possession of handguns and other concealable weapons, even though the restrictions in no way impair the operation of the militia.

2. Whether a privacy interest in the home has been incorporated into the Constitution so as to provide a right to residential possession and use of handguns.

3. Whether, despite the significant interests at issue in this case, and the voluntary submission of the case to the federal courts by the parties, the courts below were required to abstain in order to allow for the possibility of consideration by the Illinois Supreme Court of a state constitutional provision that had previously been construed by intermediate state appellate courts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1982

VICTOR D. QUILICI, *Petitioner,*

vs.

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vs.

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GEORGE L. REICHERT, et al., *Petitioners,*

vs.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, *Respondent.*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Respondents pray that the petitions for writ of certiorari be denied.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The three petitions for writ of certiorari to which this brief responds arise out of separate actions challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 81-11 of the Village of Morton Grove, Illinois. This ordinance restricts possession of concealable weapons, including handguns, within Morton Grove. The statements of the case presented by petitioners are incomplete or inaccurate in three respects.

First, the petitioners fail to acknowledge the reasons for adoption of the Morton Grove ordinance. As set forth in the preamble to the ordinance, Morton Grove's elected Board of Trustees made the following legislative findings:

> "[I]n order to promote and protect the health and safety and welfare of the public it is necessary to regulate the possession of firearms and other dangerous weapons.
>
> [T]he easy and convenient availability of certain types of firearms and weapons have increased the potentiality of firearms related deaths and injuries.
>
> [H]andguns play a major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery, and accidental injury and death."

(The complete text of the Ordinance is set forth in the Seventh Circuit's opinion, 695 F.2d at 263 n.1. That opinion is reproduced in the appendix of each of the petitions.)

Although the Stengl petition indirectly attacks these findings (Stengl Pet. 22-23 nn.45-46), none of the petitioners challenged them in the district court. To the contrary, when Morton Grove submitted as exhibits in support of its motion for summary judgment in the district court a sampling of the statistical studies supporting the Trustees' findings, petitioners moved to have the exhibits stricken as not meeting the requirements of F. R. Civ. P. 56. Petitioner Stengl, by counsel, agreed that similar materials attached to his summary judgment memorandum would, by the same reasoning, also have to be stricken, and the district court so ordered. (Order, Nov. 3, 1981.) The factual basis for the Trustees' findings thus was not in dispute in the district court.

Second, petitioners mischaracterize the substantive provisions of the ordinance. The Reichert petition states that the ordinance "completely deprives private individuals in Morton Grove of the possession of handguns . . . [t]he ban is total and absolute." (Reichert Pet. 3.) The Stengl petition

contends that Morton Grove enacted the ordinance "to prohibit and confiscate (with certain minimal exceptions) all handguns possessed in the homes of its civilian residents." (Stengl Pet. 3.) In fact, despite its general restriction on the availability of handguns and other concealable weapons, the ordinance does not prohibit anyone from possessing handguns in Morton Grove. All Morton Grove residents are permitted under the ordinance to keep and use handguns at registered gun clubs within the Village (Ordinance, § 2(E)(7)), and the ordinance completely exempts from the challenged prohibitions on-duty members of the armed forces and the National Guard (Ordinance, § 2(E)(3)), as well as licensed gun collectors, peace officers, and others whose occupations require the use of hangdguns (*id.*, §§ 2(E)(1)(2)(4)(5)(6)). Nor is any general confiscation required. Non-exempt residents who had handguns in their homes prior to the effective date of the ordinance were free to sell them or to transfer them to a gun club or a location outside Morton Grove.

Although the ordinance prohibits possession of certain dangerous weapons other than handguns,[1] it imposes no restrictions on possession of standard rifles or shotguns. The ordinance is limited in its scope to the firearms whose "easy and convenient availability" were legislatively found to increase "the potentiality of firearm related deaths and injuries."

Third, the petitioners do not disclose the results of the parallel litigation in the state court system. Prior to filing their action in the district court, petitioners Reichert and Metler joined in an action filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, raising the same state constitutional challenge asserted by all of the petitioners in the district court.

---

[1]The specified weapons include bludgeons, blackjacks, sling shots, sand clubs, sand bags, metal knuckles, and switchblade knives (Ordinance § 2(B)(1)); and machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, bombs, bomb-shells, grenades, black powder bombs, Molotov cocktails, and artillery projectiles (*id.*, § 2(B)(2)).

Kalodimos v. *Village of Morton Grove*, No. 81 CH 6424 (filed Aug. 10, 1981). On January 29, 1982, the Illinois circuit court issued an opinion rejecting petitioners' arguments concerning the state constitution and awarding summary judgment to Morton Grove. A copy of this opinion is included in the appendix, attached hereto, at A-1.

The *Kalodimos* plaintiffs appealed the state court's judgment to the Appellate Court of Illinois and moved the Supreme Court of Illinois to allow a direct appeal of the case in view of the "substantial public interest" of the case. (Motion for Direct Appeal to the Supreme Court, *Kalodimos* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, No. 56226 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed Feb. 9, 1982)). On February 19, 1982, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to allow a direct appeal.

The Illinois Appellate Court then heard the *Kalodimos* appeal, and, on February 9, 1983, issued a unanimous opinion affirming the circuit court's judgment upholding the ordinance. The appellate court decision is reported at 113 Ill. App. 3d 488 and 447 N.E.2d 849. A copy is included in the attached appendix at A-10. The *Kalodimos* plaintiffs have petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to appeal the case further, but further review is discretionary. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, §315(a) (1981). Morton Grove has filed an opposition to the petition for leave to appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The reasons given by petitioners in favor of this Court's review of the court of appeals' decision fall into three categories: Second Amendment considerations, the right of privacy in the home, and abstention. However, in each of these areas the court of appeals' decision followed established law; it does not conflict with any decision of this Court or of another court of appeals. At the same time, a reversal of the court of appeals' decision on the merits would work a profound change in the law and hamper the ability of state and local

government to deal with the crime and accidental injury associated with small firearms.

The Second Amendment. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution was construed by this Court in *Presser* v. *Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), as a limitation only on federal, not state or local, legislation. In *United States* v. *Miller*, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), this Court held that the Second Amendment prohibits only legislation that would impair the effectiveness of a state's militia. Neither of these holdings has been questioned in any subsequent decision, and both have been repeatedly applied by lower courts.

There is no reason to reexamine *Miller* or *Presser*. The history of the Second Amendment, contrary to petitioners' analyses, does reflect that it was designed to assure effective state militias, and not to provide for personal defense against criminals or the advancement of revolution. Preservation of an effective state militia, in turn, is a goal that cannot reasonably be imposed on an unwilling state and is not, in the modern United States, so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty as to require the incorporation of the Second Amendment into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Cf. Palko* v. *Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In any event, because the Morton Grove ordinance in no way affects the state militia, this case provides no basis for reaching the incorporation issue.

Privacy in the home. There is no basis for petitioners' attempts to render the concept of domestic privacy a substantive provision of the Constitution, conferring a right to defend one's dwelling with specific types of weapons. The only remotely relevant authority, *Stanley* v. *Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.11 (1969), expressly states that its holding (regarding obscene material) "in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as . . . firearms . . . a crime."

Abstention. The doctrine of abstention announced by this Court in *Railroad Commission* v. *Pullman Co.*, 312 U.S. 496

(1941), depends on the existence of an unsettled question of state law. The state law issue presented by petitioners in this case, the interpretation of a right to arms provision in the Illinois constitution (Article I, Section 22), is not unsettled. Prior to the enactment of the Morton Grove ordinance, Section 22 had been construed by the Illinois Appellate Court to disallow only a complete ban of all firearms and to place possession of arms in an "unprivileged position." *People* v. *Williams*, 60 Ill. App. 3d 726, 728, 377 N.E.2d 285, 286-87 (1978); *Rawlings* v. *Department of Law Enforcement*, 73 Ill. App. 3d 267, 275, 391 N.E.2d 758, 763 (1979). The appellate court in *Kalodimos*, and the courts below, likewise found Section 22 to accord only a limited right to some type of firearms, not a right to possess handguns.

Additionally, even if Section 22 had presented an unresolved legal issue, the courts below could have properly exercised their discretion not to abstain in view of (1) the need for a prompt determination of the enforceability of the Morton Grove ordinance and (2) the parties' voluntary submission of the issues to the federal courts. Finally, because the *Kalodimos* case has already been presented to the Illinois Supreme Court (which need not accept the case), the issue may well become moot before this Court could consider it.

ARGUMENT

I. In Rejecting Petitioners' Second Amendment Arguments, the Courts Below Followed Well Recognized and Long Settled Decisions of This Court, Which There is No Reason to Reconsider.

The principal issue raised by each of the petitioners is whether the Morton Grove ordinance violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.[2] The courts below found that the ordinance was not in conflict with the

[2]The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."

Second Amendment on the basis of two decisions of this Court: *Presser* v. *Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) and *United States* v. *Miller*, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Both of these decisions have been uniformly followed and were correctly applied. Petitioners have shown no reason why either should be reconsidered.

A. *Presser* v. *Illinois* And *United States* v. *Miller* Govern This Case.

In *Presser* v. *Illinois*, this Court rejected a claim that the Second Amendment was infringed by a state law prohibiting members of private associations from parading with arms. The Court ruled:

> "[A] conclusive answer to the contention that this amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon that of the states."

116 U.S. at 265. The Court also rejected claims (1) that a right to bear arms was one of the attributes of citizenship incorporated in the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (116 U.S. at 266-67) and (2) that the state legislation violated the due process clause of that amendment (116 U.S. at 268).

In the courts below, petitioners attempted to limit the impact of the holding of *Presser*, but they have abandoned that effort in this Court. Petitioners now frankly seek to have *Presser* overruled (or "revisited") on the ground that it does not comport with more modern incorporation analysis. Quilici Pet. 5, Stengl Pet. 4, Reichert Pet. 10-15. However, petitioners do not deny that *Presser* has been uniformly accepted by every court that has considered the question of whether the Second Amendment applies to state or local legislation. The decisions reading *Presser* to reject Second Amendment challenges to such legislation include *Cases* v. *United States*, 131 F.2d 921-22 (1st Cir. 1942), *cert. denied sub nom. Velaquez* v. *United States*, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); *Engblom* v.

Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) *aff'd in part and rev'd in part*, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982); *Eckert* v. *City of Philadelphia*, 329 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Pa. 1971), *aff'd mem.*, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1972), *cert. denied*, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); *State* v. *Swanton*, 129 Ariz. 131, 629 P.2d 98, 99 (Ariz. App. 1981); *State* v. *Amos*, 343 So. 2d 166, 168 (La. 1977); *Commonwealth* v. *Davis*, 369 Mass. 886, 890, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1976); *In re Atkinson*, 291 N.W.2d 396, 398 n.1 (Minn. 1980); *Harris* v. *State*, 83 Nev. 404, 406, 432 P.2d 929, 930 (1967); *State* v. *Sanne*, 116 N.H. 583, 364 A.2d 630 (1976). Thus, whatever the merits of petitioners' arguments that *Presser* should be overruled, it must be recognized that such a result would overturn a well established principle of law.

The same situation exists with respect to *United States* v. *Miller*. In *Miller*, this Court determined that the Second Amendment must be interpreted, consistently with its introductory declaration, to preserve the effectiveness of state militias. 307 U.S. at 178.[3] Thus, the Court refused to invalidate a federal statute prohibiting transportation in interstate commerce of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, finding that such a weapon was not shown to have any "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia." *Id.*

Petitioners attempt to limit *Miller* to a holding that sawed-off shotguns are not military equipment (Stengl Pet. 16, Reichert Pet. 15-16), but the interpretation given by *Miller* to the Second Amendment plainly goes beyond that holding.

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[3] The Court stated: "The Constitution as originally adopted granted to the Congress power—'To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States [. . . .]' U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 8. *With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.*" 307 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).

Just as certain weapons might be banned, consistently with the Second Amendment, because they are not necessary for the preservation or efficiency of a militia, so might certain persons—children, incompetents, felons—be barred from possessing weapons, because they are unqualified to serve in the militia. In either situation, the legislation would not impair the militia, and so, under *Miller*, would not violate the Second Amendment.[4]

The interpretation of *Miller*, limiting the Second Amendment to preservation of the militia, has also been uniformly followed. *United States* v. *Oakes*, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); *United States* v. *Warin*, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); *United States* v. *Johnson*, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974); *Cody* v. *United States*, 460 F.2d 34, 36-37 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); *United States* v. *Gross*, 313 F.Supp. 1330, 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1970) *aff'd*, 451 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1971); *Brown* v. *City of Chicago*, 42 Ill. 2d 501, 504, 250 N.E.2d 129, 131 (1969); *State* v. *Rupp*, 282 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 1979); *State* v. *Skinner*, 189 Neb. 457, 458, 203 N.W.2d 161, 162 (1973); *Burton* v. *Sills*, 53 N.J. 86, 248 A.2d 521 (1968), *appeal dismissed*, 394 U.S. 812 (1969).

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[4]Thus, *United States* v. *Tot*, 131 F.2d 261, 266-67 (3d Cir. 1942), *rev'd on other grounds*, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) upheld a conviction for receipt of a firearm in interstate commerce by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence. The court reasoned:

> "One could hardly argue seriously that a limitation upon the privilege of possessing weapons was unconstitutional when applied to a mental patient of the maniac type. The same would be true if the possessor were a child of immature years. In the situation at bar Congress has prohibited the receipt of weapons from interstate transactions by persons who have . . . been shown to be aggressors against society. Such a classification is entirely reasonable and does not infringe upon the preservation of the well regulated militia protected by the Second Amendment." (Footnote omitted.)

Under the interpretation set forth in *Miller*, the Morton Grove ordinance would not violate the Second Amendment, even if the amendment were applicable to local regulation, because the ordinance has no impact whatever on the state militia.

First, the ordinance does not apply to on-duty members of the Illinois National Guard, which is the organized militia of the state. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 129, § 220.05 (1981); Ordinance § 2(E)(3). Second, the concealable weapons affected by the ordinance must realistically be viewed as primarily serving other than militia purposes. Cf. *State* v. *Workman*, 35 W. Va. 367, 373, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (1891).[5] Third, even if such weapons are viewed as military equipment, the Morton Grove ordinance prohibits no one from owning, possessing, and becoming proficient in their use, provided only that the weapons be stored and used at a licensed gun club. Ordinance §§ 2(E)(7) and 2(E)(10). To the extent that it has any bearing on the militia in Illinois, residents of Morton Grove are fully able to become experts in the use of handguns.

Thus, as with *Presser*, the petitioners must argue that *Miller* was wrongly decided by this Court, and that a proper interpretation of the Second Amendment would require enforcement of a right to arms not only for preservation of state militias but also for personal self-defense (Reichert Pet. 16-17) or modern revolutionary activities (Stengl Pet. 17-19). Such arguments, again, can only be accepted at the cost of overturning a well established and consistent body of law.

---

[5] The *Workman* court held that the Second Amendment "must be held to refer to the weapons of warfare to be used by the militia, such as swords, guns, rifles, and muskets,—arms to be used in defending the state and civil liberty,—and not to pistols, bowie-knives, brass knuckles, billies, and such other weapons as are usually used in brawls, streetfights, duels, and affrays. . . ."

B. There Is No Reason To Reconsider *Presser* Or *Miller*.

The Stengl and Reichert petitions present arguments attacking the holdings of *Presser* v. *Illinois* and *United States* v. *Miller*, but these arguments provide no basis for any change in the law.

The Stengl petition focuses on *Miller*, arguing that preservation of the militia was only one of the purposes of the Second Amendment and that the amendment should be interpreted (contrary to *Miller*) to protect a right to possess arms for personal defense against "foreign invasion, domestic tyrants, or felonious attackers." (Stengl Pet. 5-6.) The primary flaw in this argument is that it fails to explain why the Second Amendment declares only the necessity of a militia as the reason for its guarantee. If a general right to arms, for a variety of individual purposes, had been intended, the amendment's declaration would be misleading surplussage.

Additionally, the Stengl argument ignores the historical context of the Second Amendment. The amendment was adopted, not out of solicitude for a right to revolution or fear that citizens might be left without means of self-defense, but as a result of concern that the new federal government might, by disuse of its power to train and equip the state militias (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8), effectively disband them, and impose a standing army on the country. Feller & Gotting, *The Second Amendment, A Second Look*, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 46, 59-60 (1966); Weatherup, *Standing Armies and Armed Citizens, An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment*, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 961, 984-93 (1972); Note, *The Right to Keep and Bear Arms*, 26 Drake L. Rev. 423, 430-32 (1977).[6]

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[6]Typical of these concerns are the following remarks of George Mason, an anti-federalist leader at the Virginia ratifying convention:

> "There are various ways of destroying the militia. A standing army may be perpetually established in their stead. I abominate and detest the idea of a government,

(footnote continued on next page)

The distrust of standing armies and a preference for defense by militias during peace time was one of the major themes in American political thought in the period of the Revolutionary War. See Weatherup, *supra*, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 977-78. The Declaration of Independence lists among the causes of the revolution the British practice of stationing large standing armies in colonies, 1 Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* 253 (1971), and several of the state constitutions adopted prior to the constitutional convention of the United States contained provisions condemning a standing army, promoting the militia, or both.[7]

(footnote continued from preceding page)

> where there is a standing army. The militia may be here destroyed by that method which has been practises in other parts of the world before; that is, by rendering them useless by disarming them. Under various pretenses, Congress may neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right to arm them. . ." 3 Elliot, *Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* 379-80 (2d ed. 1836) *reprinted in* Weatherup, *supra*, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 991.

[7]The prototype of these provisions was the Declaration of Rights in the 1776 Constitution of Virginia, which included the following Article 13:

> "That a well-regulated Militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that Standing Armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power."

1 Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* 239 (1971). Delaware and Maryland followed the Virginia formula, *id.*, at 278 and 282; South Carolina simply provided that "the military be subordinate to the civil power of the State," *id.*, at 335; and New Hampshire stated that "[a] well regulated militia is the proper, natural, and sure defense of a state," *id.*, at 378. North Carolina promoted the continuation of the militia by according

(footnote continued on next page)

In contrast, there is little indication of any interest in protecting a right to weapons for purposes other than militia service. Although state militias might ordinarily have been composed of citizens bearing their own arms (Stengl pet. 15-16), the Articles of Confederation, Art. VI, called for the newly independent states themselves to supply the necessary arms and ammunition. Only one of the early state constitutions, that of Pennsylvania, accorded a right of the people to bear arms "for the defense of themselves" as well as the state, 1 Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* 266, and a proposal by Thomas Jefferson to include in the Virginia Declaration of Rights a provision that "[n]o freeman shall be debarred the use of arms" was not adopted, *id.*, at 245, 232. Most importantly, nothing in the reported congressional debates on the adoption of the Second Amendment reflects any interest in a right to arms for any purpose other than service in the militia.

Finally, the Stengl argument, insofar as it is premised on a supposed right to revolution, contradicts this Court's holding in *Dennis* v. *United States*, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951), that no such right exists:

> "We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy."

Nor does the Stengl petition explain why, if interpretation of the Second Amendment is to be based on a right to revolution, items such as grenades, machine guns, and bazookas would not be subject to the amendment's protection.

The Reichert petition focuses its argument on *Presser* v. *Illinois*, asserting that modern incorporation doctrine

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(footnote continued from preceding page)

a right to bear arms "for the defence of the state," and Massachusetts provided a right to keep and bear arms "for the common defence"; both states also condemned standing armies. *Id.*, at 287, 342-43.

requires a reversal of the rule that the Second Amendment is inapplicable to the states. (Reichert pet. 10-15.) However, although interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has certainly changed since *Presser* was decided, there is no reason for concluding that the ruling in *Presser* would change as a result.

As the court of appeals noted below, 695 F.2d at 270, this Court has rejected the proposition that each provision of the Bill of Rights applies to the states through incorporation in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Adamson* v. *California*, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), *overruled on other grounds, Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Rather, the Court has examined provisions of the Bill of Rights individually, to determine the extent to which they embody fundamental rights essential to liberty and justice. *Palko* v. *Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), *overruled on other grounds, Benton* v. *Maryland*, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The Reichert petition ignores this individual approach, assuming that because most of the other provisions of the first eight amendments have been incorporated, the Second Amendment surely must be. (*See* Reichert Pet. 13.)[8]

Yet the Second Amendment is unique in that, as this Court held in *Miller,* it was specifically directed against encroachment on a state institution, the militia. The Amendment plainly assumes a state government actively interested in advancing the militia: the provision that the militia not be disarmed in no way assures that states will make the expenditures necessary to organize and train an armed force. Thus, the protection of the Second Amendment is only sensible if it is directed against an external and superior threat to the

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[8] Significant provisions of the bill of rights continue to apply only to the federal government. *Watson* v. *Jago*, 558 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1977) (right to indictment by grand jury under Fifth Amendment); *Iacaponi* v. *New Amsterdam Casualty Co.*, 258 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1966), *aff'd,* 379 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967), *cert. denied,* 389 U.S. 1054 (1968) (right to civil jury trial under Seventh Amendment).

militia, the federal government. Cf. L. Tribe, *American Constitutional Law* 226 n.6 (1978).

In fact, the states have largely surrendered the independence of their militias. Under the federal statutes governing National Guard the federal government has assumed responsibility for arming the organized state militias, 32 U.S.C. §§ 106, 701, and providing for their training, 32 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502. At the same time, a standing army has become a permanent and necessary element of the peace time defense of this country. *See* Feller & Gotting, *supra*, at 69. Thus, the Second Amendment, in promoting the militia, cannot be held to embody any right so implicit in American liberty that it must be enforced against the states as an element of due process.

Finally, even if the Second Amendment could reasonably be interpreted to protect state militias from state government, the present case would provide no basis for considering the issue, since the Morton Grove ordinance does not impair the operation of the militia in any way. See p. 10, above.

II. There Is No Basis For Petitioners' Suggestion That The Privacy Interests Protected By The Constitution Include A Right To Possess Firearms In The Home.

Each of the petitions in this matter proposes that the special status accorded to the home under Anglo-American law should result in a rule of constitutional law that possession of handguns must be allowed within the home. (Quilici Pet. 6, Stengl Pet. 21-24, Reichert Pet. 14-15.) The suggestion is groundless.

The privacy of the home is unquestionably accorded certain protection by the Constitution. Principally, the Fourth Amendment protects the home against warrantless entries and unreasonable searches. *Payton* v. *New York*, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980). Additionally, certain personal conduct, relating to procreation and the family, and ordinarily occurring within the home, has been protected under a constitutional right of privacy, arising from the penumbra of specific constitutional guarantees. *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*,

381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). However, none of these principles makes the home a modern philosopher's stone, capable of transforming items of contraband into objects of constitutional protection.

There appears to be only one decision of this Court in which the Constitution was found to protect possession within the home of material that could properly be prohibited outside the home. That decision is *Stanley* v. *Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), heavily relied on by the Stengl petition (at 21, 24). Yet, in holding that possession of obscene material within the home could not be constitutionally prohibited, the Court in *Stanley* expressly relied on the connection between putatively obscene material and the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. The Court expressly declined to extend its holding to items of contraband other than obscenity.

> "We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making the mere private possession of obscene material a crime.
>
> * * *
>
> What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, *firearms*, or stolen goods, a crime. . . . No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal." (Emphasis added.)

394 U.S. at 568, 568 n.11. Thus, laws prohibiting possession and use of marijuana in the home have been repeatedly upheld against challenges based on *Stanley*. *Leary* v. *United States*, 544 F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir. 1977); *United States* v. *Drotar*, 416 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1969), *vacated on other grounds*, 402 U.S. 939 (1971); *Illinois Norml, Inc.* v. *Scott*, 66 Ill. App.3d 633, 636, 383 N.E.2d 1330, 1332 (1st Dist. 1978).

The other authorities cited in the Reichert petition (at 14) are old English judicial decisions authorizing the use of firearms in the home pursuant to statutes in effect at the time of the decisions. These cases have no bearing on the state of English law under other statutory schemes. There

was never any absolute right to arms in England, and England ultimately enacted one of the strictest gun control laws in the world. 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 12, § 30 (1937). See Feller & Gotting, *The Second Amendment, A Second Look*, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 46, 49 n.10 (1966).[9]

In the end, petitioners' arguments on the privacy of the home are an invitation to this Court to create a new limitation on the ability of state and local government to deal with the pressing social problem of firearm-related crime and injury. As the Reichert petition notes (at 10), a number of communities have expressed interest in adopting legislation similar to the Morton Grove ordinance. Other local governments, such as the City of Chicago, have determined to limit firearm possession through restrictive registration. Municipal Code of Chicago, ch. 11.1 and 11.2 (1982); cf. New York Penal Laws § 400.00 (1982).

These efforts to control firearm proliferation should not be lightly interfered with by the courts. As this Court noted in *Whalen* v. *Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977):

> "State legislation which has some effect on individual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part. For we have frequently recognized that individual States have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern." (Footnotes omitted.)

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[9] The Stengl petition (at 6 n.12) erroneously states that Blackstone considered a right to arms as among "the absolute rights of individuals". Blackstone actually defined the common law "right to arms" as the "right of the subject . . . of having arms for their [sic] defence *suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law.*" 1 W. Blackstone, *Commentaries* *143-44 (emphasis added). Blackstone specifically listed this right to arms as the last of a group of "auxiliary" or "subordinate" rights in contrast to "the principal absolute rights" of "personal security, personal liberty, and private property." *Id.* at *140-41.

In this context, the Court reiterated the warning of Mr. Justice Brandeis in *New State Ice Co.* v. *Liebman*, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion):

> "Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. * * * But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles."

The warning is fully applicable here.

III. The Decision of The Courts Below Not to Abstain From Exercising Jurisdiction Was in Full Accord With Established Principles.

The remaining issue raised by the petitions is whether the courts below were required, under the doctrine of *Railroad Commission* v. *Pullman Co.*, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over petitioners' complaints until the Illinois Supreme Court was afforded an opportunity to determine whether the Morton Grove ordinance violated Article I, Section 22 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.[10] This issue is argued only in the Reichert petition (at 6-10). The Quilici petition does not raise the issue, and the Stengl petition declines to address it, observing that the claims under Section 22 "will probably be decided by the state supreme court before this Court can act." (Stengl pet. 4.)

Indeed, one of the principal reasons why this Court should not grant certiorari to consider the abstention issue is that the issue will likely become moot. The *Kalodimos* case, which

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[10] Section 22 provides: "Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

raises petitioners' state constitutional claims, is presently pending before the Illinois Supreme Court, fully briefed on petition for leave to appeal. (See p. 4, above.) The Illinois Supreme Court may, in its discretion, deny leave to appeal without further proceedings. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 315(a)(1981). Even if leave to appeal is granted, the case would proceed in the Illinois Supreme Court no less promptly than the present cases in this Court. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(g), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 315(g) (1981).

Moreover, the abstention decisions of the courts below were correct. *Pullman* abstention is appropriate only if potentially dispositive questions of state law are unresolved. *Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors* v. *De Otero*, 426 U.S. 572, 598 (1976); *Harman* v. *Forssenius*, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965). Thus, in *Reetz* v. *Bozanich*, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970), the principal authority cited in the *Reichert* petition, this Court vacated a decision enjoining enforcement of state statutes and regulations as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Alaska Constitution, because the Alaska constitutional provisions had "never been interpreted by an Alaska court." 397 U.S. at 86. The other authorities cited by the Reichert petition involved state law issues which were similarly unsettled.

That is not the situation presented here. As the district court below noted (Mem. Op. and Order, Aug. 20, 1981 at 2; Reichert Pet. 73a), Article I, Section 22 of the Illinois Constitution had been interpreted at least twice by Illinois courts. *Rawlings* v. *Department of Law Enforcement*, 73 Ill. App. 3d 267, 391 N.E.2d 758 (3d Dist. 1979); *People* v. *Williams*, 60 Ill. App. 3d 726, 377 N.E.2d 285 (1st Dist. 1978). Both decisions upheld statutes challenged under Section 22 because the statutes did not constitute a total ban on the possession of all arms, *e.g.*, *Williams*, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 377 N.E.2d at 286-87, the same interpretation of Section 22 applied by the district court and by the court of appeals. 532 F. Supp. at

1176, 695 F.2d at 267.[11] The Illinois courts that have already ruled in the *Kalodimos* case unanimously reached the same result. See A-7, A-12 to A-13. The meaning of Section 22 is not unsettled.

Furthermore, abstention is an equitable doctrine, *Hostetter* v. *Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.*, 377 U.S. 324, 328-29 (1964), and here, on several grounds, the equities are weighted heavily against abstention. First, the procedures employed by the petitioners reflect a waiver of abstention claims. Both the *Stengl* and *Reichert* petitioners voluntarily submitted their state law claims to the federal courts by filing complaints in the district court. Their cases were not removed. Indeed, the *Stengl* case was filed on July 20, 1981, one week before the issue of abstention was raised in the district court and three weeks before the *Reichert* appellants filed their state court case.[12] Although it is true that the *Reichert* appellants did not file their federal action until their state case had been stayed, nothing forced them to file in federal court; they were free to pursue their state claims in the Illinois courts when the stay was lifted, and they have done so. Having voluntarily submitted their state claims to federal courts, the *Stengl* and *Reichert* appellants waived their abstention arguments. *See First Savings & Loan Association of Boston* v. *Greenwald*, 591 F.2d 417, 424-25 (1st Cir. 1979). The remaining petitioner, Victor Quilici, did not request the court of appeals to abstain and did not urge the district court's refusal to abstain as error on appeal.

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[11] Contrary to the assertion in the *Reichert* petition (at 7), the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals expresses no disagreement with the majority's interpretation of Section 22. The dissent's only argument involving the Illinois Constitution was that the Morton Grove ordinance exceeded the home rule powers elsewhere accorded by that constitution. See 695 F.2d at 275.

[12] The *Stengl* appellants never pursued their state claims in the Illinois courts and elected not to join Quilici's abstention motion in the district court.

Second, as the court of appeals correctly noted, any conflict between the state and federal systems is greatly reduced when state officials bring a case to federal court. *See Southwest Airlines Co.* v. *Texas International Airlines*, 546 F.2d 84, 93 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 832 (1977). The *Reichert* petition asserts that Illinois has an interest in having its courts determine whether Morton Grove's ordinance violated Section 22. (Reichert Pet. 7.) However, abstention seeks, in major part, to avoid unnecessary friction with state sovereigns. *Pullman*, 312 U.S. at 501. Here, the state "sovereign" brought one of the cases to federal court and the parties now seeking abstention brought the others. The grant or denial of abstention did not obstruct or displace the Illinois courts' authority to decide the validity of the Morton Grove ordinance in the separate lawsuit pending in the state courts.

Finally, it was certainly appropriate for the court of appeals to consider the public importance of the subject matter of this case in determining not to require full litigation through the Illinois judicial system before allowing resolution by the federal courts.[13] The delay resulting from abstention is a factor to be considered in any case, *Bellotti* v. *Baird*, 428 U.S. 132, 150 (1976), and where, as here, issues of significant public concern are at stake, this delay may properly influence a court's exercise of discretion. *Cf. Procunier* v. *Martinez*, 416 U.S. 396, 402 (1974) (refusing to require abstention in case of claimed deprivation of First Amendment right of expression); *Harman* v. *Forssenius*, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965) (same, voting rights).

There is no abstention issue raised by the decisions below that justifies this Court's review.

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[13]There is no procedure for certification of legal questions to the Illinois Supreme Court, see *Wynn* v. *Carey*, 582 F.2d 1375, 1382 (7th Cir. 1978), and that court has declined to accept direct review of the state court decision upholding the Morton Grove ordinance. See p. 4, above.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petitions for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS P. SULLIVAN*
MICHAEL H. SALSBURY
EUGENE R. WEDOFF
JENNER & BLOCK
21 DuPont Circle, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-5470

MARTIN C. ASHMAN
134 North LaSalle Street
Room 1316
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 782-3484

Attorneys for Respondents

Dated: July 15, 1983

In The

Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois
County Department—Chancery Division

MICHAEL KALODIMOS, GEORGE L. REICHERT, ROBERT E. METLER, and RICHARD A. SCHNELL, *Plaintiffs,* vs. VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, *Defendant.*	No.: 81 Ch 6424

MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND ORDER

This cause coming on to be heard on Plaintiffs' motion for Preliminary Injunction and Plaintiffs' and Defendant's cross motions for Summary Judgment pursuant to § 57 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, § 57 (1981), the parties having appeared through their respective counsel and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises issues the following memorandum of law and order:

Nature of the Case

The single issue in this case is the constitutionality, under Article I, section 22 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, of Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, Ordinance No. 81-11, "An Ordinance Regulating the Possession of Firearms and Other Dangerous Weapons," enacted June 8, 1981. (Appended hereto.)

The Ordinance, as stated in its preamble, is designed to limit the easy availability of certain types of firearms and weapons which are believed to have increased the potentiality for firearm-related deaths and injuries in the Village. The challenge to the Ordinance is based upon its prohibition of the class of weapons commonly referred to as "handguns."

Article I, section 22 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides:

> "Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

It is the position of the plaintiffs that the ban on "handguns" by the Village effectively nullifies the section 22 right to bear arms. In defense of its action, the Village states that the Ordinance is a reasonable exercise of its police power to protect the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens.

Memorandum of Law

In order to determine whether a particular Constitutional provision is being abrogated, it is necessary to first construe its meaning. By all relevant criteria, section 22 can be construed to provide a right to bear arms which is conditioned upon the reasonable exercise of state and local legislative police power.

The plain meaning of the language of section 22 is the starting point in construing the provision. Each word will be given its common and ordinary meaning unless a contrary meaning is clearly evident. *Coalition for Political Honesty* v. *State Board of Elections,* 65 Ill. 2d 453, 464, 359 N.E.2d 138, 143 (1977). Using this rule, section 22 provides a right to bear arms of a non-specified type, conditioned upon legislative action.

The use of an introductory phrase does not change the plain meaning construction. The plaintiffs urge that the introductory phrase, "subject only to the police power", is

superfluous and secondary to the "right to bear arms." In construing the constitution, one clause will not be allowed to defeat another if by the use of a reasonable interpretation the two can be made to stand together. *Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Assn.* v. *Village of Oak Park,* 54 Ill. 2d 200, 296 N.E.2d 344 (1973). It is important to render every word operative rather than rendering some words idle and nugatory. 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 128 (8th ed. 1927); 2 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, sec. 4705 (3d ed. 1943). Likewise, a subtle construction for the purpose of limiting the operation of the language must be avoided. *U.S. ex rel. Hoover* v. *Elsea,* 501 F. Supp. 83, 88 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The two clauses of section 22 read together using a plain meaning construction provide for a conditional right to bear arms in Illinois.

A second method of constitutional construction is a determination of the intent of the framers of the provision in question. *Client Follow-Up Company* v. *Hynes,* 75 Ill. 2d 208, 216, 390 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1979). A review of the majority report submitted by the Committee which proposed the section is a reliable method of determining this intent. *Id.* at 216-17, 390 N.E. 2d at 850. The report of the Committee on the Bill of Rights which proposed section 22 states in pertinent part:

> This provision affirms the right of the individual citizen to possess and use arms, including firearms. It also makes explicit the principle that this right is not absolute, but is subject to regulations required by the safety and good order of society.

VI Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 84, (1970) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings]. This Committee report gives a clear guide to the proposal which was ultimately adopted by the convention. It must be given considerable weight in determining the understanding of the majority of convention delegates who adopted the provision and the report. *Coalition for Political Honesty* v.

State Board of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 467-71, 359 N.E.2d 138 145-47 (1977).

The constitutional convention debates themselves are useful only to the extent that they indicate the consensus of the delegates. *Paper Supply Co.* v. *City of Chicago,* 57 Ill. 2d 553, 570, 317 N.E.2d 3, 12 (1974). Isolated comments made during the debates do not indicate a consensus, merely a particular concern of a particular delegate. *People ex rel. Cosentino* v. *County of Adams,* 82 Ill. 2d 565, 570-71, 413 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1980). As recently restated in *Cosentino,* " 'It is possible to lift from the constitutional debates on almost any provision statements by a delegate or a few delegates which will support a particular proposition; however, such a discussion by a few does not establish the intent or understanding of the convention.' " 82 Ill. 2d at 569, 413 N.E.2d at 871, citing *Client Follow-Up Co.* v. *Hynes,* 75 Ill. 2d 208, 221, 390 N.E.2d 847, 852 (1979). The initial case construing a provision of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, *People ex rel. Scott* v. *Grivette,* 50 Ill. 2d 156, 161-62, 277 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1972), expressed the view that the intent of the delegates should be considered as it was manifested in the consensus of debate and the adoption of the section following argument.

The delegates who considered section 22 had before them the language and Committee Report and had heard the explanations given by the spokesman for that committee. See III Proceedings at 1686-1706. Their adoption of the section as proposed expressly indicates a majority agreement with both the language of the section and the Report. This Court thus places its reliance upon the language of the section as proposed and adopted and the explanation of the section provided in the Committee Report.

Plaintiffs urge that the right given in the second clause of section 22 is taken away by an exercise of the first clause, the police power. The Committee, however, in its Report saw fit to explain the use of the first phrase and its parameters. The Report states that the phrase is designed to make explicit that the right to bear arms is conditional. VI Proceedings at

88. Indeed, the Illinois courts, both prior to and following the 1970 constitutional provision, have recognized the right to bear arms as a conditional right. The Committee Report cited *Biffer* v. *City of Chicago,* 278 Ill. 562, 570, 116 N.E. 182, 195 (1916), for the proposition that the state may regulate the use of weapons by means of its police power without infringing the right to bear arms. Also cited was *Brown* v. *City of Chicago,* 42 Ill.2d 501, 504, 250 N.E.2d 129, 131 (1969), upholding a gun registration ordinance on the same grounds. Following ratification of section 22, the constitutionality of local ordinances was considered. In two recent cases, the courts recognized that the right to bear arms was conditioned upon the exercise of the police power of the state. *People* v. *Williams,* 60 Ill. App.3d 726, 728, 377 N.E.2d 285, 287 (1978); *People* v. *Graves,* 23 Ill. App.3d 762, 320 N.E.2d 95, 98 (1974).

It is apparent from both the language of section 22 and the Committee Report that the framers of the provision intended the right to bear arms as a conditional right subject to the exercise of the police power.

In addition to the above criteria for constitutional construction, it is important to consider the understanding which the voters had at the time of ratification. *People ex rel. Cosentino* v. *County of Adams,* 82 Ill.2d 565, 569-70, 413 N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (1980). The language of the official explanation provided directly to each voter prior to ratification is the most reliable determinant of their common understanding. *Id.* at 569, 413 N.E.2d at 871. Plaintiffs argue that a consideration of media coverage prior to ratification is a means of determining the voter's understanding of section 22. It is recognized that statements by state officials widely reported in the media concerning constitutional provisions may indicate the information that was considered by voters prior to ratification. *Client Follow-Up Co.* v. *Hynes,* 75 Ill.2d 208, 390 N.E.2d 847 (1979); *Wolfson* v. *Avery,* 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955). In this case, however, plaintiffs rely upon a single newspaper article published prior to ratification which merely restates the official explanation of the provision.

The Court finds that it is the official explanation itself which must be relied upon. That explanation is as follows:

> This new section states that the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed, except as the exercise of this right may be regulated by appropriate laws to safeguard the welfare of the community.

Official Text, Proposed 1970 Constitution for the State of Illinois 5 (1970); see also VII Proceedings at 2689. This explanation followed the actual test of section 22. It was couched in language from the Committee Report and in conjunction with the text was intended as an explanation of the conditional right to bear arms.

The clear language of section 22, the intent of its framers and the intent of the voters who ratified it all point to the conclusion that the right to bear arms in Illinois is conditioned upon the reasonable exercise of the police power. It is the aspect of reasonableness that must be the focus of any attack upon a local ordinance such as that enacted by the Village of Morton Grove.

The standard by which the reasonableness of a local ordinance is tested was most recently defined in *City of Carbondale* v. *Brewster,* 78 Ill.2d 111, 114-15, 398 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1979), *appeal dismissed,* 446 U.S. 931 (1980). A valid exercise of police power must relate to protection of the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare or convenience and must be a reasonable method by which to accomplish such objective. *Id.* at 115, 398 N.E.2d at 831. The test for reasonableness has been stated as a question of "whether the ends sought to be achieved are proper for invocation of the police power and whether the means utilized to achieve those ends are reasonable." *Rawlings* v. *Illinois Dept. of Law Enforcement,* 73 Ill. App.3d 267, 273, 391 N.E.2d 758, 762 (1979).

The possession and use of firearms has consistently been held to be a proper subject for exercise of the police power in Illinois. *Brown* v. *City of Chicago,* 42 Ill.2d 501, 250 N.E.2d

129 (1969); *Biffer* v. *City of Chicago,* 278 Ill. 562, 116 N.E. 182 (1917); *Rawlings* v. *Illinois Dept. of Law Enforcement,* 73 Ill. App.3d 267, 391 N.E.2d 758 (1979); *People* v. *Williams,* 60 Ill. App.3d 726, 377 N.E.2d 285 (1978); *People* v. *Graves,* 23 Ill. App.3d 762, 320 N.E.2d 95 (1974). The only inquiry necessary is whether the Village of Morton Grove Ordinance 81-11 is a resaonable exercise of this power.

The Village has broad discretion to determine what its public safety and welfare problems are and the means it will use to address them. *City of Carbondale* v. *Brewster,* 78 Ill.2d 111, 115, 398 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1979), *appeal dismissed,* 446 U.S. 931 (1980). Where, as in this case, there is a difference of opinion as to the measures which should be taken, that controversy does not cause the measure to fail. *Id.* at 115, 398 N.E.2d at 831. It is within the discretion of the elected officials of the Village to define a problem and seek a solution. The preamble of the Ordinance defines the problem as "the easy and convenient availability of certain types of firearms and weapons [which] have increased the potentiality of firearms related deaths and injuries;. . ." Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, Ordinance No. 81-11, preamble, par. 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Ordinance].

The Ordinance is limited in scope to certain classifications of weapons which the Village believes "play a major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery, and accidental injury and death." Ordinance preamble, par. 3. The Ordinance does not, on its face or as a practical matter, nullify the right of the citizen to bear arms in defense of person and property in the Village. The measure targets one type of arm, the "handgun," for control. The individual is free, subject of course to any existing state regulations, to possess and use another type of arm.

The Court recognizes that a considerable difference of opinion exists concerning the cause of the problem addressed in the Ordinance and therefore, the solution to the problem. However, it is within the discretion of the elected officials of the Village of Morton Grove to determine their public health

and safety problems and take the steps they believe will effectively address those problems. The Court will not disturb the regulation simply because of a difference of opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expediency. *City of Carbondale* v. *Brewster,* 78 Ill.2d 111, 115, 398 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1979), *appeal dismissed,* 446 U.S. 931 (1980).

Plaintiffs correctly state that local ordinances could be enacted which would have the effect of varying the section 22 right to arms based on one's location in the state. Plaintiff fails to argue for state preemption of this field of legislation. At no time has the power of the Village to enact legislation on this subject been raised.

It is not disputed that a "handgun" is an arm within the meaning of section 22. It is argued that the type of weapon subject to the Ordinance, the "handgun," is entitled to special constitutional protection. The cases relied upon for this proposition do not concern ordinances such as the one in question. For example, the court in *In Re Brickey,* 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902), struck a local ordinance which totally prohibited the carrying of all firearms. The Morton Grove Ordinance bans only a single type of firearm.

Plaintiffs cite *People* v. *Zerillo,* 210 Mich. 635, 189 N.E. 927 (1922), for its special treatment of hand-type arms. An important distinction between the regulation which was struck and the Ordinance in question here is that the Michigan law was subject to the arbitrary enforcement of local officials. In addition, a particular class of persons was denied access to the weapons. No such discretion or arbitrary discrimination is provided for in this case. The Ordinance provides only for certain well-defined exceptions to the ban.

The Village of Morton Grove Ordinance represents a valid exercise of police power regulation. The public health and safety problem was defined and measures limited in scope were designed to address the problem. Neither the express language of section 22 nor the intent of the framers and voters of the state are contravened by the Ordinance.

ORDER

Based upon the above memorandum of law, it is hereby ordered that:

1. Plaintiffs' motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied;
2. Plaintiffs' motion for Summary Judgment is denied;
3. Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment is granted;
4. Any Stay of Ordinance No. 8011 imposed by this Court is herewith lifted;
5. No just cause is presented to delay appeal of this matter.

DATED: January 29, 1982

ENTER:

(signed) ALBERT GREEN
Judge

Third Division Filed 2-9-83

No. 82-282

MICHAEL KALODIMOS,
GEORGE L. REICHERT,
ROBERT E. METLER, and
RICHARD A. SCHNELL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,
an Illinois Municipal Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.

Honorable
Albert Green
Presiding

PRESIDING JUSTICE McNAMARA delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Michael Kalodimos, George L. Reichert, Robert Metler, and Richard A. Schnell, filed this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of defendant Village of Morton Grove's Ordinance 81-11, "An Ordinance Regulating the Possession of Firearms & Other Dangerous Weapons." Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's decision granting defendant's cross motion for summary judgment in which the validity of the ordinance was upheld, and denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

The ordinance in question provides that "[n]o person shall possess, in the Village of Morton Grove *** [a]ny handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently inoperative." The ordinance specifies various exceptions for certain categories of persons such as peace officers, prison officials, members of armed forces and national guard, and, under certain conditions, licensed gun collectors. Plaintiffs, residents of Morton Grove who own and possess operative handguns and who fall within none of the exceptions, charge that the ordinance is invalid because it infringes upon the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms as

guaranteed by Article I, Section 22 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.

Section 22 provides that "[s]ubject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." In construing section 22 the trial court relied primarily upon the plain meaning of its language, the majority report submitted to the delegates by the committee which proposed the section to the constitutional convention, and on the official explanation which accompanied the proposed constitutional provision on its submission to Illinois voters. The trial court found the handgun to be an arm within the meaning of section 22. Noting that individuals were free to possess other types of arms, however, the trial court found the Morton Grove ordinance to be a reasonable exercise of the village's police power.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the plain meaning of section 22, as understood by both the drafters and the voters, establishes that it guarantees the right to keep a handgun. That right, plaintiffs argue, is subject to reasonable regulation, not prohibition, pursuant to the police power. They therefore urge that we find the ordinance in question to be an unreasonable and improper exercise of police power in that it operates to nullify a constitutional guarantee.

Both sides agree that handguns are included within the class of arms protected by section 22. Their point of contention is whether a ban on handguns alone is a proper exercise of local power where citizens are free to possess other types of protected arms.

Plaintiffs correctly assert that the true inquiry in interpreting a constitutional provision concerns the common understanding of that provision by the voters who, by their vote, gave life to the provision. (*People ex rel. Cosentino* v. *County of Adams* (1980), 82 Ill.2d 565, 413 N.E.2d 870.) We find, however, that in the present case, examination of the most reliable determinants of that common understanding leaves unresolved the issue with which we are concerned.

The official explanation merely asserts that "the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed, except as the exercise of this right may be regulated by appropriate laws to safeguard the welfare of the community." (7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2689 (Proceedings).) This explanation provides no more guidance than does the plain language of section 22 in helping to determine whether such regulation may include a prohibition against one category of protected arms.

Similarly, plaintiffs' reliance on the majority report of the Bill of Rights Committee is misplaced. Plaintiffs argue that the report, which was presented by the majority of the committee who proposed section 22 to the delegates prior to their debates, indicates that both the members of the committee and the other delegates understood section 22 to preclude a ban on the possession of handguns. The portion of the report on which plaintiffs rely provides:

> "[T]he proposed new provision *** seeks to assure that the 'arms' involved are not limited by the armaments or needs of the state militia or other military body. The substance of the right is that a citizen has the right to possess and make reasonable use of arms that law-abiding persons commonly employ for purposes of recreation or the protection of person and property. Laws that attempted to ban all possession or use of such arms, or laws that subjected possession or use of such arms to regulations or taxes so onerous that all possession or use was effectively banned, would be invalid." (6 Proceedings 87.)

While the language clearly indicates that handguns are within the type of arms protected by section 22, it does not clearly preclude a ban on handguns absent a ban on other protected arms. Indeed, the report also notes the "extraordinary threat to the safety and good order of society" posed by the possession of arms and recites that in response to that threat section 22 would provide for an "extraordinary degree

of control" over the possession of arms pursuant to the police power. (6 Proceedings 88.)

Since the meaning accorded section 22 is otherwise doubtful with regard to the extent of control permissible under the police power, it is appropriate to consult the debates of the delegates to the constitutional convention to ascertain the intent of the drafters. (*Drury* v. *County of McLean* (1982), 89 Ill.2d 417, 433 N.E.2d 666.) This approach was recently used by the Federal Court in *Quilici* v. *Village of Morton Grove*, Nos. 82-1045, 1076, 1132 (7th Cir., Dec. 6, 1982), where it upheld the constitutionality of the same ordinance in question here. Finding the language of section 22 to be unclear, the court based its interpretation of the section on the constitutional debates. It concluded that section 22 grants only the right to possess arms, not handguns. While finding that the framers intended handguns to be within the class of protected arms, it also found the framers to have envisioned that a permissible exercise of police power might include a prohibition on handguns. We believe that this interpretation of section 22 is amply supported by the debates and we adopt the reasoning expressed by the seventh circuit.

We reject plaintiffs' contention that the debates regarding the present issue are confusing, contradictory and inherently unreliable. Conversely, we find that they demonstrated a consensus among the delegates with regard to the scope of protection accorded handguns pursuant to section 22 and the extent to which that protection is limited by the police power.

In explaining section 22 to the delegates, Delegate Foster specifically asserted the majority view that "under this provision, the state would have the right to prohibit some classes of firearms, such as war weapons, handguns, or some other category." (3 Proceedings 1687.) This view was reiterated throughout the debates, (3 Proceedings 1688, 1689, 1693, 1718), the consensus of the majority being that, although section 22 "would prevent a complete ban on all guns. ***

there could be a ban on certain categories." (3 Proceedings 1693.) Although some delegates who supported the majority view expressed a preference for a stronger right to arms which would have precluded such a ban (3 Proceedings 1704, 1707), no delegate indicated that he so interpreted section 22 as it was proposed and ratified.

Even the minority delegates favored the interpretation given by the majority. Their concern was that the language, which they viewed as ambiguous, might be misinterpreted by the courts and result in the invalidation of the type of arms regulation with which we are concerned in the present case. (3 Proceedings 1693, 1694, 1695, 1709.) While recognizing that a ban on handguns probably would be upheld by the courts, the minority was reluctant to take that risk. (3 Proceedings 1693, 1694). Fearing that the effect of the majority proposal could possibly "be to limit, in some indefinite and unpredictable fashion, the power of the legislature to pass whatever laws are needed in this field to protect the public safety," the minority preferred omitting entirely from the constitution any provision purporting to guarantee a right to bear arms. 3 Proceedings 1696, 1697.

The debates thus convince us that the framers intended that a ban on handguns be a permissible exercise of the police power pursuant to section 22. Although the explanation given the voters was less clear in this regard, we find no indication that the common understanding of the voters was contrary to that of the framers.

We reject plaintiffs' contention that this interpretation of section 22 renders illusory the right to arms. While we agree with plaintiffs that gun control legislation could vary from municipality to municipality, we find that the framers envisioned this kind of local control. Such variations would not render the right illusory because the citizens of each municipality would retain the right to bear some type of arms.

We also reject plaintiffs' contention that the ordinance in question was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. A municipality has broad discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure those interests. We will not disturb an exercise of police power merely because there is room for a difference of opinion as to its wisdom or necessity. (*City of Carbondale* v. *Brewster* (1979), 78 Ill.2d 111, 398 N.E.2d 829.) In the present case, the purpose of the ordinance in question, "to promote and protect the health and safety and welfare of the public" (Village of Morton Grove Ordinance 81-11), is certainly a proper interest for the exercise of police power. (*City of Carbondale* v. *Brewster*.) Furthermore, we find that the means adopted, a ban on handguns, constituted a reasonable means of promoting that interest. See *Rawlings* v. *Illinois Dept. of Law Enforcement* (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 267, 391 N.E.2d 758.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County upholding the validity of the Morton Grove ordinance is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
McGILLICUDDY and
WHITE, J.J. concur.

Nos. 82-1822, 82-1930 & 82-1934

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

VICTOR D. QUILICI,
v. *Petitioner,*

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,
Respondent.

GEORGE L. REICHERT and ROBERT E. METLER,
v. *Petitioners,*

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,
Respondent.

ROBERT STENGL, *et al.*,
v. *Petitioners,*

VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE,
Respondent.

On Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

MOTION OF HANDGUN CONTROL, INC., FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OPPOSING CERTIORARI AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

JAMES S. CAMPBELL
(Counsel of Record)
ROBERT M. SEDGWICK, JR.
WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 872-6000
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Handgun Control, Inc.

July 15, 1983

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IN THE

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MOTION OF HANDGUN CONTROL, INC., FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OPPOSING CERTIORARI

Handgun Control, Inc., ("HCI") respectfully moves for leave to file the attached brief *amicus curiae* pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of this Court. Counsel for the respondent, Morton Grove, and for petitioner Quilici have consented to the filing;[1] counsel for the other peti-

[1] Their written consents have been filed with the Clerk of this Court.

tioners were asked to consent but did not. This brief is thus filed with the consent of the parties in No. 82-1822; leave to file by motion is sought only in Nos. 82-1930 and 82-1934.

Petitioners seek review of a decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the constitutionality of a village ordinance regulating possession of handguns in Morton Grove, Illinois. HCI is a non-profit, non-partisan, public interest organization, with over seven hundred thousand supporters nationwide. Its primary goal is to develop and implement reasonable measures for controlling handgun violence. HCI has members who reside in Morton Grove and who, like the general public, are exposed to an increased risk of death or serious bodily harm as a result of the widespread, largely uncontrolled availability of handguns. HCI has advocated reasonable handgun restrictions before numerous federal, state, and local governmental bodies, and participated in the case below as *amicus curiae* in the Seventh Circuit. HCI therefore has a strong interest both in upholding the challenged ordinance, which is a significant step toward effective handgun regulation, and in judicial recognition of legislators' constitutional power to control handguns.

HCI has participated as *amicus curiae* in a number of cases challenging the validity of local restrictions on private possession of handguns, including *McIntosh v. Washington*, 395 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1978), and this case below. In this connection, and in connection with its work on assisting elected officials in formulating handgun control legislation, HCI has studied the history and meaning of the provisions of the federal constitution that bear on the power of localities to control handguns. Accordingly, HCI believes that it can assist the Court in determining the validity of the challenged ordinance under the federal constitution. HCI is an appropriate party to address this issue in a suit in which national firearms organizations, such as the National Rifle Association and

the Second Amendment Foundation, are substantial participants.[2]

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James S. Campbell
(Counsel of Record)
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 872-6000
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Handgun Control, Inc.

July 15, 1983

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[2] Three attorneys from the National Rifle Association are "of counsel" on the Reichert & Metler petition. Counsel for the Stengl petitioners, Don B. Kates, Jr., was retained for this case by the Second Amendment Foundation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE HANDGUN CONTROL, INC., OPPOSING CERTIORARI

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Handgun Control, Inc., ("HCI") is a non-profit, non-partisan, public interest organization whose primary goal is to develop and implement reasonable measures for controlling handgun violence. HCI has members who reside in Morton Grove and who, like the general public, are exposed to an increased risk of death or serious bodily injury as a result of the widespread, largely uncontrolled availability of handguns. HCI has advocated reasonable handgun controls before various federal, state, and local governmental bodies, and has a strong interest both in upholding the challenged ordinance and in confirming legislators' constitutional power to control handguns.

HCI has participated as *amicus curiae* in a number of cases challenging local government restrictions on private possession of handguns, including this case below. In this connection, and in connection with its work assisting elected officials in formulating handgun control legislation, HCI has studied the history and meaning of the provisions of the federal constitution that bear on the power of local governments to control handguns. HCI is an appropriate party to address the federal constitutional issues in this suit, particularly in light of the substantial role that national firearms organizations are playing in the case.[1]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The challenged ordinance regulates the possession of machine guns, submachine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and operative handguns in the village of Morton Grove, Illinois. Ordinance No. 81-11.[2] The corporate authorities of Morton Grove singled out these particular types of firearms for special restrictions because "the easy and convenient availability of [these firearms] have increased the potentiality of firearm related deaths and injuries" and because handguns, in particular, "play a major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery, and accidental injury and death." *Id.*

Petitioners do not challenge Morton Grove's decision to regulate the possession of machine guns, submachine guns, or sawed-off shotguns. They do, however, challenge its decision to restrict possession of operative handguns. Possession of such handguns is generally prohibited

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[1] Three attorneys from the National Rifle Association are "of counsel" on the Reichert & Metler petition. Don B. Kates, Jr., counsel for the Stengl petitioners, was retained for this case by the Second Amendment Foundation.

[2] The challenged ordinance also regulates the possession of certain other dangerous weapons and explosive devices. The ordinance, relevant federal constitutional provisions, and certain pertinent English statutes are set forth in an Appendix to this brief.

within the village, subject to a number of specified exceptions, including exceptions for licensed gun clubs, for "gun club members while such members are using their handguns at the gun club premises," and for "[m]embers of the . . . Illinois National Guard or the Reserve Officers Training Corps while in the performance of their official duties." *Id.*

The court below rejected each of petitioners' federal constitutional arguments against the validity of the ordinance. *Quilici v. Morton Grove*, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982). It held (1) that the second amendment does not apply to state and local governments; (2) that, in any event, the second amendment does not protect private possession of handguns; and (3) that the ordinance does not violate the ninth amendment. 695 F.2d at 269-71. It sustained the validity of the ordinance in all respects.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case presents no substantial question requiring the attention of this Court. There is no conflict among the circuits or state courts of last resort on any of the issues that petitioners offer for review. The rulings of the court below were fully consistent with—and, indeed, compelled by—prior, unquestioned decisions of this Court.

The second amendment restricts only the powers of the national government, and not those of state or local governments. This Court and others have uniformly refused to incorporate the limited second amendment right to arms into the fourteenth amendment as a restriction on the states. To treat the second amendment as restricting the states would be inconsistent both with the intentions of the founding fathers and with the limited present-day role of private weapons in national defense.

Even if the second amendment did apply to state and local governments, it still would not prohibit legislative restrictions, such as those contained in the Morton Grove

ordinance, on private possession of handguns. The amendment restricts only governmental actions that significantly impair a state's organized militia. Moreover, the limited right to keep and bear arms that the amendment protects has always been treated as subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of public welfare and safety.

The penumbras of other amendments do not create a constitutional right to possess and use handguns "privately" in defense of the home. This Court and others have refused to recognize any such novel right.

ARGUMENT

I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT DOES NOT RESTRICT STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

The second amendment states that "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." It was proposed and ratified in response to Anti-Federalist fears that the new federal government might disarm state militias and replace them with a national standing army. Numerous unquestioned decisions by this Court and others support the holding of the court below that this amendment restricts only the powers of the federal government, and does not apply to the states either directly or through the fourteenth amendment.

Thus, in *Presser v. Illinois*, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886), this Court held that the second amendment "is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon that of the States." *Accord Miller v. Texas*, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894); *United States v. Cruikshank*, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). The *Presser* Court unequivocally rejected claims that the "privileges and immunities" or "due process" clauses of the four-

teenth amendment prohibit state regulation of weaponry. 116 U.S. at 266-68.

Neither this Court nor any lower court has ever questioned the soundness of these rulings. This Court has itself described *Presser* as holding that second amendment rights are "not safeguarded against state action by the Privileges and Immunities Clause or other provision of the Fourteenth Amendment." *Malloy v. Hogan*, 377 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1964). Moreover, in *Burton v. Sills*, 394 U.S. 812 (1969), this Court dismissed for want of a substantial question an appeal from a holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court that the second amendment does not bar reasonable state regulation of firearms. With the possible exception of one aberrant 1902 ruling by the Idaho Supreme Court,[3] no federal court or state court of last resort has held, since *Presser*, that the second amendment applies to the states. Instead, courts have repeatedly reaffirmed that the second amendment does not apply to the states, either directly or by incorporation into the fourteenth amendment.[4]

The logic behind these decisions is compelling. The second amendment was intended to regulate the relationship between the national government and the states, rather than between the national government and individual citizens. Its "obvious purpose" was "to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of" state

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[3] *In re Brickey*, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902) (alternative ground for decision; *Presser*, *Miller*, *Cruikshank*, and the history of the second amendment not mentioned or discussed).

[4] *See, e.g., Cases v. United States*, 131 F.2d 916, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1942), *cert. denied*, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); *Application of Atkinson*, 291 N.W.2d 396, 398 n.1 (Minn. 1980); *State v. Amos*, 343 So. 2d 166, 168 (La. 1977); *Commonwealth v. Davis*, 369 Mass. 886, 890, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1976); *State v. Sanne*, 116 N.H. 583, 584, 364 A.2d 630 (1976); *Harris v. State*, 83 Nev. 404, 406, 432 P.2d 929, 930 (1967).

militias, *United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939),[5] as the events leading up to the adoption of the amendment amply attest.

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia vigorously debated the proper extent of federal control over state militias.[6] They viewed permitting some degree of federal control as the principal practical alternative to maintaining a substantial standing national army, which at the time was anathema to many Americans.[7] They resolved the issue at the convention by dividing authority over the militia between federal and

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[5] *Accord United States v. Warin*, 530 F.2d 103, 106-07 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); *United States v. Tot*, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), *rev'd on other grounds*, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); *Burton v. Sills*, 53 N.J. 86, 95-101, 248 A.2d 521, 525-29 (1968), *appeal dismissed*, 394 U.S. 812 (1969); *Commonwealth v. Davis*, 369 Mass. at 890, 343 N.E.2d at 850.

[6] A. Prescott, *Drafting the Federal Constitution: A Rearrangement of Madison's Notes* 515-25 (1941); Weatherup, *Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment*, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 961, 980-84 (1975); W. Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy* 14-16 (1957).

[7] Many colonial Americans had inherited an almost obsessive concern with standing armies from the seventeenth century British, who suffered at the hands of the standing armies of Cromwell and James II. J. Miller, *Origins of the American Revolution* 440 (1943); B. Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* 61-63 (1967). This obsession was compounded by American experiences with British troops before and during the Revolution. Bailyn, *id.* at 112-19; Feller & Gotting, *The Second Amendment: A Second Look*, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 46, 49-56 (1966). As a result, many state constitutions of the Revolutionary era expressed antipathy towards standing armies, as did the Declaration of Independence. *See, e.g.*, 1 B. Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* (1971) [hereinafter cited as "*Schwartz*"] at 235 (Virginia), 266 (Pennsylvania), 278 (Delaware), 282 (Maryland), 287 (North Carolina), 324 (Vermont), 342-43 (Massachusetts), 378 (New Hampshire), 253 (Declaration of Independence).

state governments.[8] A number of Anti-Federalist delegates opposed this compromise, however, and it became a focal point for Anti-Federalist attacks during the ratification process.[9] A major theme of these attacks was that the federal government might, by abuse or non-use of its power over state militias, disarm and destroy them.[10] One result was that a number of states formally proposed that the integrity of those militias be constitutionally protected by recognizing a right to keep and bear arms.[11] The second amendment responded to these fears

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[8] The framers authorized Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States . . . ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. However, they expressly reserved to the states "the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of Training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." *Id.* Moreover, they authorized Congress to "provide for calling forth the Militia" only for three specified purposes—"to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." *Id.*, cl. 15.

[9] *See, e.g.*, A. Prescott, *supra* note 6, at 517-25 (statements of Ellsworth, Dickinson, Sherman, Gerry, and Martin); Levin, *The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience*, 68 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 148, 154-59 (1971); Weatherup, *supra* note 6, at 984-93; W. Riker, *supra* note 6, at 16-18; Feller & Gotting, *supra* note 7, at 56-60.

[10] *See, e.g.*, 1 J. Elliot, *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as *"Elliot's Debates"*] at 371-72 (Letter from Luther Martin to the Maryland State Legislature); 3 *Elliot's Debates* 47-48, 51-52, 169, 378-81, 384-88, 402, 407, 410-26 (statements of Henry, Mason, Clay, and Grayson at the Virginia Ratification Convention).

[11] *E.g.*, 2 *Schwartz* 842 (Virginia), 912 (New York), 968 (North Carolina); 1 *Elliot's Debates* 335 (Rhode Island). Other proposals for preserving state militias included expressly empowering the states to organize, arm, and discipline their own militias if Congress failed to act, 2 *Schwartz* 843 (Virginia), 969 (North Carolina), and providing that state militias be subject to federal martial law only in time of war, rebellion, insurrection, or invasion,

(footnote continued on next page)

and proposals by safeguarding state militias against disarmament by the federal government.[12] Its historical purpose, expressly reflected in its initial clause, was not to guarantee individual citizens against disarmament by the states,[13] but to protect state militias.

It would be historically incongruous to incorporate this amendment, intended "as a *protection for* the States . . . against possible encroachments by the federal power," [14] into the fourteenth amendment as a *limitation against* the states. It would also be inconsistent with current incorporation doctrine. This Court has incorporated into the fourteenth amendment only those rights that are "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty," *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968), or that are "fundamental to our free society," *Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). In *Lewis v. United States*, 445 U.S. 55, 65 & 65 n.8 (1980), however, this Court explicitly refused to characterize posses-

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2 *Schwartz* 843 (Virginia), 912 (New York), 969 (North Carolina); 1 *Elliot's Debates* 335 (Rhode Island); *see also* U.S. Const. amend. V, which provides that a militia member may be indicted in federal cases only with the consent of a grand jury unless "in actual service in time of War or public danger."

[12] *See* 2 *Schwartz* 1107 (statement of E. Gerry); Feller & Gotting, *supra* note 7, at 61-62; Weatherup, *supra* note 6, at 994-95; Levin, *supra* note 9, at 158-59.

[13] Several states already had constitutional provisions granting their citizenry collectively a qualified right to arms, each in the context of disparaging standing armies. 1 *Schwartz* 266 (Pennsylvania), 287 (North Carolina), 324 (Vermont), 342-43 (Massachusetts). Moreover, a number of state constitutions already declared that a "well-regulated" militia was the "proper," "natural," "safe" or "sure" defense of a "free state" or "free government," each in similar contexts. *Id.* at 235 (Virginia), 278 (Delaware), 282 (Maryland), 378 (New Hampshire). Similar language appeared in several formal state proposals for amending the federal constitution to assure a preference for state militias over standing armies. 2 *Schwartz* 842 (Virginia), 912 (New York), 968 (North Carolina); 1 *Elliot's Debates* 335 (Rhode Island).

[14] *United States v. Tot*, 131 F.2d at 266 (emphasis added).

sion of firearms as a fundamental constitutional right—a result uniformly reached by lower courts as well.[15]

Lewis is soundly based on present day realities. Keeping private weapons in support of state militias is not today a fundamental aspect of an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty—if indeed it ever was.[16] The states have substantially ceded responsibility for their militias to the federal government.[17] For many years Congress has supplied states with money for militia firearms and has provided for federal control over their care and disposition.[18] Private citizens are not expected—or,

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[15] In *Lewis*, this Court held that a statute prohibiting individuals convicted of felonies—including individuals whose convictions were concededly unreliable because obtained without constitutionally required counsel—from possessing *any firearms at all* (18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(c)(3) (1976)) did not "trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties," 445 U.S. at 65 n.8, and therefore needed only a rational basis to survive due process attack. *Accord Marchese v. California*, 545 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1976); *United States v. Ransom*, 515 F.2d 885, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 424 U.S. 944 (1976); *United States v. Day*, 476 F.2d 562, 567-68 (6th Cir. 1973); *United States v. Synnes*, 438 F.2d 764, 771-72, 771 n.9 (8th Cir. 1971), *vacated on other grounds*, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972); *United States v. Karnes*, 437 F.2d 284, 286-89 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971).

[16] The founding fathers were by no means unanimously agreed that independent state militias would be effective defense forces. *See, e.g.*, A. Prescott, *supra* note 6, at 516, 519, 522, 523 (statements of C. Pinckney, C.C. Pinckney, Madison, and Randolph at the Constitutional Convention); Weiner, *The Militia Clause of the Constitution*, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 181, 183 (1940) (quoting George Washington).

[17] Weiner, *supra* note 16, at 186-210; W. Riker, *supra* note 6, at 104-17; Rohner, *The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History*, 16 Cath. U.L. Rev. 53, 72 (1966); *see also* 32 U.S.C. chs. 1, 3, 5 & 7 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

[18] Department of Justice, "Memorandum Re Federal Firearms Control and the Second Amendment," submitted by Attorney General Katzenbach to the Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, *reprinted in Hearings on the Federal Firearms Act*, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 44 (1965).

in most cases, even permitted—to use their own firearms in militia service.[19] Today, our society neither recoils from maintaining standing armies nor relies primarily on state militias for its defense.[20]

II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT REGULATING PRIVATE POSSESSION OF HANDGUNS.

Even assuming—contrary to reason and this Court's prior holdings—that the second amendment limits the power of state and local governments to regulate private possession of weaponry, the amendment would not prohibit Morton Grove's restrictions on possession of handguns. As the court below concluded, the sole function of the second amendment is to protect well regulated state militias—a function not in any way threatened by the challenged ordinance. Moreover, the limited right to arms that the amendment does protect has always been treated as subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of public welfare and safety.

The language of the second amendment suggests that its purpose is limited to protecting organized and effective state militias. The terms "arms" and "bear arms" have always been associated with organized military activity.[21] Moreover, the amendment's opening clause explains that the purpose of guaranteeing a right to arms is to preserve "well regulated" militias, which are declared to be "necessary to the security of a free State."

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[19] *See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis*, 369 Mass. at 888, 343 N.E.2d at 849 ("[O]ur militia . . . is now equipped and supported by public funds"); Feller & Gotting, *supra* note 7, at 68-70.

[20] The Stengl petitioners forthrightly concede that recent militia contributions to national defense have been "minor." Petition at 19.

[21] *See* N. Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language* ("arms"—etymology, definitions 1 and 2, and examples; "bear"—definition 3) (1828); 1 *The Oxford English Dictionary* 449 ("arm"—etymology and definitions 1 through 9), 731 ("bear" —definition 6a) (1933).

The history of the second amendment, discussed above, amply sustains this reading. Moreover, this Court has authoritatively embraced it in *United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. at 178. There this Court established the principle that the second amendment cannot be invoked to defend possession of a firearm without a showing that the "preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia" is somehow at risk. The circuit courts have repeatedly endorsed and applied this principle in rejecting second amendment defenses in federal firearms prosecutions.[22]

Petitioners have wholly failed to show that the challenged Morton Grove ordinance in any way impairs the organized ("well regulated") Illinois militia. First, that militia is armed and trained at public expense, and does not depend on privately furnished arms for its strength.[23] Second, the ordinance does not even apply to long guns, which account for over two-thirds of all civilian firearms nationwide,[24] and would be more suitable for military use than handguns. Third, the ordinance in any event per-

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[22] *See, e.g., United States v. Oakes*, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) *United States v. Warin*, 530 F.2d at 105-08; *United States v. Johnson*, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); *Cody v. United States*, 460 F.2d 34, 36-37 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); *United States v. McCutcheon*, 446 F.2d 133, 135-36 (7th Cir. 1971); *United States v. Johnson*, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1971); *United States v. Synnes*, 438 F.2d at 772; *United States v. Tot*, 131 F.2d at 266; *Cases v. United States*, 131 F.2d at 922-23. This Court itself relied on *Miller* when it refused, in *Lewis*, to treat possession of firearms as a fundamental constitutional right. 445 U.S. at 65 n.8.

[23] *See, e.g.*, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 129 (1979); 32 U.S.C. chs. 1, 5 & 7 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

[24] United States Comptroller General, Report to the Congress, *Handgun Control: Effectiveness and Costs* 18 (1978); Turley, *Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims*, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 41, 41-42 (1982).

mits possession and use of handguns at gun clubs, thus allowing citizens to become proficient in handgun use and to maintain a stock-pile of handguns for whatever militia application may be imagined.[25] Fourth, the ordinance expressly allows possession of handguns by militia members "while in the performance of their official duties."

In any event, the right to arms has always been treated as "subject to . . . well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case," including considerations of public welfare. *Robertson v. Baldwin*, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897).[26] The English Bill of Rights merely established that "the subjects which are protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions *and as allowed by law*,"[27] thus committing control of firearms to the discretion of the legislature.[28]

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[25] By allowing stockpiles at local gun clubs, the ordinance affirmatively permits the sort of arms cache whose attempted confiscation by the British at Concord, Massachusetts, was the final spark igniting the American Revolution.

[26] *See also United States v. Freed*, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (possession of inherently dangerous weapons may be criminalized without requiring *scienter*); *Konigsberg v. State Bar*, 366 U.S. 36, 50 n.10 (1961); *Adams v. Williams*, 407 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing the . . . possession of pistols may not be enacted.").

[27] Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2, *reprinted in* 1 *Schwartz, supra* note 6, at 43 (emphasis added). Blackstone characterized this limited Protestant right to arms as "a public allowance, *under due restrictions*, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, *when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression*." 1 W. Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* * 139 (1765) (emphasis added).

[28] In the year that the Bill of Rights was enacted, Parliament passed a statute prohibiting any "papist or reputed papist" who refused to take a loyalty oath from keeping arms without the permission of a justice of the peace. Government Security Act, 1688, 1 W. & M., ch. 15 (*reprinted in* the Appendix to this brief). A sub-

Numerous early English and colonial American statutes regulating the possession and use of weapons similarly contradict the notion of any "absolute" historical right to arms.[29]

The Morton Grove ordinance is sensibly directed at preventing the worst firearms abuses. It is widely accepted that handguns account for a grossly disproportionate share of firearms crime, firearms injury, and firearms death. Long guns, such as rifles and shotguns, are estimated to outnumber handguns well over two to one, nationwide.[30] Yet, handguns account for roughly

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sequent statute entirely denied the right to bear arms in large parts of Scotland. Highlands Act, 1715, 1 Geo., stat. 2, ch. 54 (*reprinted in* the Appendix to this brief). Currently, Great Britain stringently regulates all forms of firearms, particularly handguns. *See generally* Rohner, *supra* note 17, at 62-63; Feller & Gotting, *supra* note 7, at 47-49; Note, *Firearms: Problems of Control*, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1328, 1342-43 (1967).

[29] For example, the Statute of Northampton, enacted in 1328, provided that no man shall "go nor ride armed by Night nor by Day in Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or other Ministers nor in no Part elsewhere . . . ." 2 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (*reprinted in* the Appendix to this brief); *see* Rohner, *supra* note 17, at 61. Moreover, the Game Preservation Act of 1670, 22 Car. 2, ch. 25, § 3 (*reprinted in* the Appendix to this brief), essentially forbade common people from possessing guns. Additional English precedents for regulating arms are described in Subcommittee on the Constitution, Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., *The Right to Keep and Bear Arms* 1-3 (Comm. Print 1982), while colonial American precedents are described in Levin, *supra* note 9, at 149-50 (citing laws from Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia). Precedents for *requiring* citizens to keep certain types of arms (*see, e.g.*, Reichert & Metler petition at 16; Stengl petition at 9 n.15) simply help demonstrate that the treatment of weaponry has always been left to sound legislative discretion. All of the relevant English cases cited by the Reichert & Metler petitioners (at 14) and the Stengl petitioners (at 12 n.26) turned on questions of statutory construction, rather than common law right, and appear to have involved long guns, rather than handguns.

[30] *See supra* note 24.

four out of every five firearms murders,[31] and for still higher proportions of aggravated assaults and robberies in which firearms are used.[32] Handguns are, moreover, the preponderant choice in firearms suicides.[33] It is handgun deaths that make firearms "[s]econd only to motor vehicles as a cause of fatal injury," [34] and it is the handgun that "is the principal weapon of gun misuse." [35]

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[31] FBI, *Uniform Crime Report* 10, 12 (1981); FBI, *Uniform Crime Report* 13 (1980); Comptroller General, *Handgun Control: Effectiveness and Costs, supra* note 24, at 13.

[32] G. Newton & F. Zimring, *Firearms & Violence in American Life: A Staff Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence* 49-50 (1969). Handguns are concealable, portable, and unmistakably lethal. These factors make them ideal weapons for determined criminals. Similar factors make them the firearms most likely to be used in spontaneous "crimes of passion," and far more likely to inflict death or serious injury in such crimes than likely alternative weapons, such as knives. Comptroller General, *Handgun Control: Effectiveness and Costs, supra* note 24, at 25-31; Zimring, *Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?*, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 721 (1968). Roughly four out of five firearms confiscated by the police nationwide are handguns, rather than long guns. S. Brill, *Firearms Abuse: A Research and Policy Report* 42-44 (1977).

[33] Handguns are uniquely suited for impulsive suicides. Unlike long guns, they can easily be aimed and discharged at one's own vital regions; and, once fired, they are highly likely to be lethal. Newton & Zimring, *supra* note 32, at 33-34. They are therefore the weapon of choice in firearms suicides. Turley, *supra* note 24, at 55-56 (1982); Browning, *Epidemiology of Suicide: Firearms*, 15 Comprehensive Psychiatry 549 (1974).

[34] United States Surgeon General, *Healthy People: The Surgeon General's Report on Health Promotion and Disease Prevention* 113 (1979). In 1977, about 49,000 people were killed in motor vehicle accidents, and about 32,000 were killed with firearms. *Id.* at 111, 113. Of the 32,000 killed with firearms, half were suicides, two-fifths were homicides, and the remainder were victims of accidents or of unclassified incidents. *Id.* at 113.

[35] Newton & Zimring, *supra* note 32, at 139. *See generally* Fields, *Handgun Prohibition and Social Necessity*, 23 St. Louis U.L.J. 35

There is nothing unreasonable about Morton Grove's decision to subject handguns to relatively strict control. In doing so, Morton Grove has simply joined numerous other jurisdictions that focus their regulatory efforts on handguns, rather than long guns.[36] Such manifestly reasonable legislative actions are not forbidden by the second amendment.[37] Indeed, no federal court has ever struck down a statute or ordinance as repugnant to that amendment.

III. NO OTHER PROVISION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS REGULATING PRIVATE POSSESSION OF HANDGUNS.

The Stengl and Quilici petitioners claim a constitutional right to possess and use handguns "privately," in defense of their homes, under the fourth, ninth, fourteenth, and other, unspecified, amendments, even if the second amendment does not apply.[38] This novel proposition has never been accepted by any circuit court or state

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(1979); Fields, *Guns, Crime and the Negligent Gun Owner*, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 141 (1982); Turley, *supra* note 24, *passim*.

[36] Cook & Blose, *State Programs for Screening Handgun Buyers*, 455 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 80 (1981). All fifty states, plus the District of Columbia, place some restrictions on purchasing, carrying, or owning handguns. Comptroller General, *Handgun Control: Effectiveness and Costs*, *supra* note 24, at 4-7; *see also* Note, *Firearms: Problems of Control*, *supra* note 28, at 1338-43.

[37] *Cf. Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) ("individual States have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern").

[38] Stengl petition at 21-24; Quilici petition at 5-6. The Reichert & Metler petitioners refrain from suggesting that this issue merits review. The court below passed only on the Stengl and Quilici petitioners' ninth and fourteenth amendment claims, and not on their claims under the fourth and other, unspecified, amendments. *Certiorari* on these latter issues is thus particularly inappropriate. *See Tennessee v. Dunlap*, 426 U.S. 312, 314 n.2 (1976); 13 *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 817.41, at SC17-42 (2d ed. 1982).

court of last resort, and is directly contradicted by this Court's prior decisions.

In *Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969), this Court expressly rejected the notion that there is a constitutional right to possess firearms in the home. In the course of holding that the first amendment, as incorporated into the fourteenth, does protect private possession of pornography in the home, this Court explicitly cautioned that "[w]hat we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make the possession of other items, such as narcotics, *firearms*, or stolen goods, a crime." 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 (emphasis added).[39] This Court has since noted that any general federal constitutional "right of privacy" is a limited one, extending—outside the context of freedoms directly protected by the first, fourth, and fifth amendments—only to "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." *Paul v. Davis*, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).[40] Indeed, in *Lewis v. United States*, 445 U.S. at 65 n.8, this Court explicitly held that prohibiting private possession of firearms does not "trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties."[41]

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[39] *Cf. Crane v. Campbell*, 245 U.S. 304 (1917) (the fourteenth amendment incorporates no right to privately possess intoxicating liquors for personal use). Numerous lower courts have relied on the qualifying sentence in *Stanley* to uphold restrictions on the possession of marijuana and cocaine against "privacy right" challenges. *See, e.g., United States v. Drotar*, 416 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1969), *vacated on other grounds*, 402 U.S. 939 (1971); *NORML v. Bell*, 488 F. Supp. 123, 133-34 (D.D.C. 1980); *Louisiana Affiliate of NORML v. Guste*, 380 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. La. 1974), *aff'd*, 511 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 867 (1975).

[40] *See also Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).

[41] *See supra* note 15. Lower courts have routinely upheld imposition of criminal penalties for possessing firearms inside the

In any event, petitioners have not shown that the challenged ordinance unreasonably interferes with any conceivable privacy or self-defense interests they might have. They do not claim that the village has attempted to enforce the challenged ordinance against them in their homes.[42] Nor have they demonstrated that possession of handguns in the home is either a peculiarly private affair, or even an effective self-defense measure.[43] Thus, they have wholly failed to raise any substantial issue suggesting infringement of constitutionally protected privacy or self-defense rights.

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home. *See, e.g., United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines*, 504 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974); *United States v. Tot*, 131 F.2d 261; *Commonwealth v. Davis*, 369 Mass. 886, 343 N.E.2d 847.

[42] The privacy/home-defense issue presented by petitioners is thus so abstract and hypothetical as to raise questions about their standing to raise it. *See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union*, 442 U.S. 289, 297-99, 303-05 (1979); *Poe v. Ullman*, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).

[43] Petitioners' argument that permitting handguns in the home will facilitate shooting intruders by itself negates any inference that possession of handguns is a purely private affair. In any case, an intruder is far more likely to steal a home-defense handgun than to be driven off by it, and is far less likely to be seriously injured by it than are the gun owner's family and friends. Newton & Zimring, *supra* note 32, at 62-65; United States Conference of Mayors, *How Well Does the Handgun Protect You and Your Family, passim* (1976). Moreover, the challenged ordinance does not prohibit private possession of all home-defense weapons, or even all home-defense firearms. Instead, it freely permits private possession of all long guns, on the clearly reasonable ground that such firearms are far less frequently abused.

CONCLUSION

Because this case presents no substantial question requiring resolution by this Court, and because there is no conflict among the circuits or state courts of last resort on any of the issues involved, HCI urges that the petitions for *certiorari* be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES S. CAMPBELL
(Counsel of Record)
ROBERT M. SEDGWICK, JR.
WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 872-6000
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Handgun Control, Inc.

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APPENDIX

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

The Congress shall have Power . . .

> To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; . . .
>
> To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
>
> To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . . Art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 15, 16.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . keep Troops . . . . Art. I, § 10, cl. 3.

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the . . . Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . . Art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. Amend. II.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . Amend. IV.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising . . . in

the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . . Amend. V.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. Amend. IX.

. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Amend. XIV, § 1.

ENGLISH STATUTES:

Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, ch. 3 [1]

> ITEM it is enacted, That no Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except the King's Servants in his Presence, and his Ministers in executing of the King's Precepts, or of their Office, and such as be in their Company assisting them, and also upon a cry made for Arms to keep the Peace, and the same in such Places where such Acts happen, be so hardy to come before the King's Justices, or other of the King's Ministers doing their Office with Force and Arms, nor bring no Force in affray of the Peace, nor to go nor ride armed by Night nor by Day in Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or other Ministers nor in no Part elsewhere, upon Pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to Prison at the King's Pleasure . . . .

[1] 1 *Statutes at Large* 197 (1786).

Game Preservation Act, 1670, 22 Car. 2, ch. 25 § 3 [2]

An act for the better preservation of the game, and for securing warrens not inclosed, and the several fishings of this realm.

WHEREAS divers disorderly persons, laying aside their lawful trades and employments, do betake themselves to the stealing, taking and killing of conies, hares, pheasants, partridges and other game intended to be preserved by former laws, with guns, dogs, tramels, lowbels, hays and other nets, snares, hare-pipes and other engines, to the great damage of this realm, and prejudice of noblemen, gentlemen and lords of manors and others, owners of warrens: . . .

III. . . . [I]t is hereby enacted and declared, That all and every person and persons not having lands and tenements, or some other estate of inheritance, in his own or his wife's right, of the clear yearly value of one hundred pounds *per annum*, or for term of life, or having lease or leases of ninety-nine years, or for any longer term, of the clear yearly value of one hundred and fifty pounds, other than the son and heir apparent of an esquire, or other person of higher degree, and the owners and keepers of forests, parks, chases or warrens, being stocked with deer or conies for their necessary use, in respect of the said forests, parks, chases or warrens, are hereby declared to be persons by the laws of this realm not allowed to have or keep for themselves, or any other person or persons, any guns, bows, greyhounds, setting-dogs, ferrets, coney-dogs, lurchers, hays, nets, lowbels, hare-pipes, gins, snares, or other engines aforesaid; but shall be and are hereby prohibited to have, keep or use the same.

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[2] 8 *Statutes at Large* 380-81 (1763).

Government Security Act, 1688, 1 W. & M., ch. 15 [3]

An act for the better securing the government by disarming papists and reputed papists.

* * * *

IV. And for the better securing their Majesties persons and government; be it further enacted and declared, That no papist or reputed papist [refusing to make a specified declaration of loyalty] shall or may have or keep in his house, or elsewhere, or in the possession of any other person to his use, or at his disposition, any arms, weapons, gunpowder, or ammunition (other than such necessary weapons, as shall be allowed to him by order of the justices of the peace, at their general quarter sessions, for the defence of his house or person) and that any two or more justices of the peace, from time to time, by warrant under their hands and seals, may authorize and impower any person or persons in the day-time, with the assistance of the constable or his deputy, or the tythingman, or headborough, where the search shall be (who are hereby required to be aiding and assisting herein) to search for all arms, weapons, gunpowder, or ammunition, which shall be in the house, custody, or possession of any such papist or reputed papist, and seize the same for the use of their Majesties, and their successors . . . .

Highlands Act, 1715, 1 Geo., stat. 2, ch. 54 [4]

An act for the more effectual securing [sic] the peace of the *Highlands* in *Scotland*.

WHEREAS the custom that has two [sic] long prevailed amongst the *Highlanders of Scotland*, of having arms in their custody, and using and bearing them in travelling abroad in the fields, and at publick meetings, has greatly obstructed the civilizing of the

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[3] 9 *Statutes at Large* 15-17 (1764).

[4] 13 *Statutes at Large* 306-07 (1764).

people within the counties herein after named; has prevented their applying themselves to husbandry, manufactories, trade, and other virtuous and profitable employments; has been the cause of many riots, robberies, and tumults; hath and does tend to disappoint the execution of the law, to the dishonour of government, and unspeakable loss of his Majesty's subjects; has in a peculiar manner been one of the fatal causes of the late unnatural rebellion, and may occasion the like or greater calamity in time to come, if not prevented by a proper remedy: be it therefore enacted . . . [that] it shall not be lawful for any person or persons within [the Highland shires] to have in his or their custody, use or bear broad sword, or target, poynard, whingar, or durk, side-pistol or side-pistols, or gun, or any other warlike weapons, in the fields, or in the way, coming or going to, from, or at any church, market, fair, burials, huntings, meetings, or any other occasion whatsoever, within the bounds aforesaid, or to come into the *Low-Countries* armed, as aforesaid: and in case any of the said person or persons above described, shall have in his custody, use or bear arms, otherwise than in this act directed, every such person or persons so offending . . . shall, for the first offence, forfeit all such arms, and be liable to a fine, not exceeding the sum of forty pounds sterling, and not under the sum of five pounds sterling, and to be imprisoned till payment of the said fine . . . .

MORTON GROVE ORDINANCE NO. 81-11:

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND OTHER DANGEROUS WEAPONS

WHEREAS, it has been determined that in order to promote and protect the health and safety and welfare of the public it is necessary to regulate the possession of firearms and other dangerous weapons, and

WHEREAS, the Corporate Authorities of the Village of Morton Grove have found and determined that the easy and convenient availability of certain types of firearms and weapons have increased the potentiality of firearm related deaths and injuries; and

WHEREAS, handguns play a major role in the commission of homocide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery, and accidental injury and death.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE PRESIDENT AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1: The Corporate Authorities do hereby incorporate the foregoing WHEREAS clauses into this Ordinance, thereby making the findings as hereinabove set forth.

SECTION 2: That Chapter 132 of the Code of Ordinances of the Village of Morton Grove be and is hereby amended by the addition of the following section:

"*Section 132.102.* Weapons Control

(A) *Definitions:*

Firearm: "Firearm" means any device, by whatever name known, which is designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion of gas or escape of gas; excluding however;

(1) Any pneumatic gun, spring gun or B-B gun which expels a single globular projectile not exceeding .18 inches in diameter.

(2) Any device used exclusively for signalling or safety and required or recommended by the United States Coast Guard or the Interstate Commerce Commission.

(3) Any device used exclusively for the firing of stud cartridges, explosive rivets or similar industrial ammunition.

(4) An antique firearm (other than a machine gun) which, although designed as a weapon, the Department of Law Enforcement of the State of Illinois finds by reason of the date of its manufacture, value, design and other characteristics is primarily a collector's item and is not likely to be used as a weapon.

(5) Model rockets designed to propel a model vehicle in a vertical direction.

Handgun: Any firearm which (a) is designed or redesigned or made or remade, and intended to be fired while held in one hand or (b) having a barrel of less than 10 inches in length or (c) a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person.

Person: Any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, club, society or joint stock company.

Handgun Dealer: Any person engaged in the business of (a) selling or renting handguns at wholesale or retail (b) manufacture of handguns (c) repairing handguns or making or fitting special barrels or trigger mechanisms to handguns.

Licensed Firearm Collector: Any person licensed as a collector by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States under and by virtue of Title 18, United States Code, Section 923.

Licensed Gun Club: A club or organization, organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets, licensed by the Village of Morton Grove under Section 90.20 of the Code of Ordinances of the Village of Morton Grove.

(B) *Possession:*

No person shall possess, in the Village of Morton Grove the following:

(1) Any bludgeon, black-jack, slug shot, sand club, sand bag, metal knuckles or any knife, commonly referred to as a switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring, or other device in the handle of the knife; or

(2) Any weapon from which 8 or more shots or bullets may be discharged by a single function of the firing device, any shotgun having one or more barrels less than 18 inches in length, sometimes called a sawed off shotgun or any weapon made from a shotgun, whether by alteration, modification or otherwise, if such weapon, as modified or altered has an overall length of less than 26 inches, or a barrel length of less than 18 inches or any bomb, bombshell, grenade, bottle or other container containing an explosive substance of over one-quarter ounce for like purposes, such as, but not limited to black powder bombs and Motolov cocktails or artillery projectiles; or

(3) Any handgun, unless the same has been rendered permanently inoperative.

(C) Subsection B(1) shall not apply to or affect any peace officer.

(D) Subsection B(2) shall not apply to or affect the following:

(1) Peace officers;

(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries, jails and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense;

(3) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the Illinois National Guard, while in the performance of their official duties; and

(4) Transportation of machine guns to those persons authorized under Subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection to possess machine guns, if the machine guns are broken down in a non-functioning state or not immediately accessible.

(E) Subsection B(3) does not apply to or affect the following:

(1) Peace officers or any person summoned by any peace officer to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace while he is actually engaged in assisting such officer and if such handgun was provided by the peace officer;

(2) Wardens, superintendents and keeper of prisons, penitentiaries, jails and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offsense;

(3) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the Illinois National Guard or the Reserve Officers Training Corps while in the performance of their official duties.

(4) Special Agents employed by a railroad or a public utility to perform police functions; guards of armored car companies; watchmen and security guards actually and regularly employed in the commercial or industrial operation for the protection of persons employed and private property related to such commercial or industrial operation;

(5) Agents and investigators of the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission authorized by the commission to carry such weapons;

(6) Licensed gun collectors;

(7) Licensed gun clubs provided the gun club has premises from which it operates and maintains possession and control of handguns used by its members, and has procedures and facilities for keeping such handguns in a safe place, under the control of the club's chief officer, at all times when they are not being used for target shooting or other sporting or recreation purposes at the premises of the gun club and gun club members while such members, are using their handguns at the gun club premises;

(8) A possession of an antique firearm;

(9) Transportation of handguns to those persons authorized under Subparagraph 1 through 8 of this subsection to possess handguns, if the handguns are broken down in a non-functioning state or not immediately accessible.

(10) Transportation of handguns by persons from a licensed gun club to another licensed gun club or transportation from a licensed gun club to a gun club outside the limits of Morton Grove; provided however that the transportation is for the purpose of engaging in competitive target shooting or for the purpose of permanently keeping said handgun at such new gun club; and provided further that at all times during such transportation said handgun shall have trigger locks securely fastened to the handgun.

(F) *Penalty:*

(1) Any person violating Section B(1) or B(2) of this Ordinance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less than $100.00 nor more than $500.000 or incarcerated for up to six months for each such offense.

(2) Any person violating Section B(3) of this Ordinance shall be guilty of a petty offense and shall be fined no less than $50.00 nor more than $500.00 for such offense. Any person violating Section B(3) of this Ordinance more than one time shall be guilty of a misde-

meanor and shall be fined no less than $100.00 nor more than $500.00 or incarcerated for up to six months for each such offense.

(3) Upon conviction of a violation of Section B(1) through B(3) of this Ordinance any weapon seized shall be confiscated by the trial court and when no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, the court may transfer such weapon to the Morton Grove Police Dept. who shall destroy them.

(G) *Voluntary Delivery to Police Department:*

(1) If a person voluntarily and peaceably delivers and abandons to the Morton Grove Police Dept. any weapon mentioned in Sections B(1) through B(3), such delivery shall preclude the arrest and prosecution of such person on a charge of violating any provision of this Ordinance with respect to the weapon voluntarily delivered. Delivery under this section may be made at the headquarters of the police department or by summoning a police officer to the person's residence or place of business. Every weapon to be delivered and abandoned to the police department under this paragraph shall be unloaded and securely wrapped in a package and in the case of delivery to the police headquarters, the package shall be carried in open view. No person who delivers and abandons a weapon under this section shall be required to furnish identification, photographs or fingerprints. No amount of money shall be paid for any weapon delivered or abandoned under this paragraph.

(2) Whenever any weapon is surrendered under this section, the police department shall inquire of all law enforcement agencies whether such weapon is needed as evidence and if the same is not needed as evidence, it shall be destroyed.

(H) All weapons ordered confiscated by the court under the provision of Section F(3) and all weapons received by the Morton Grove Police Department under and

by virtue of Section G shall be held and identified as to owner, where possible, by the Morton Grove Police Department for a period of five years prior to their being destroyed.

(I) *Construction:*

Nothing in this Ordinance shall be construed or applied to necessarily require or excuse non compliance with any provision of the laws of the State of Illinois or to the laws of the United States. This Ordinance and the penalties proscribed for violation hereof, shall not supersede, but shall supplement all statutes of the State of Illinois or of the United States in which similar conduct may be prohibited or regulated.

(J) *Severability:*

If any provisions of this Ordinance or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Ordinance and the applicability of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

(K) The provisions of this Ordinance shall take effect ninety (90) days from and after its passage, approval and publication in pamphlet form according to law."

SECTION 3: That this Ordinance shall be published in pamphlet form. Said pamphlet shall be received as evidence of the passage and legal publication of this Ordinance.